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Cooperatives struggled financially in the early 2000s because profitability declined. In 
2002, Agway and Farmland Industries filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Since then, bankruptcy 
events have been few, and cooperative profitability has rebounded. Credit risk is of particular 
importance to lenders, managers, and directors. Lenders are primarily concerned about their 
counterparty exposure to cooperatives while cooperatives are concerned about meeting their debt 
obligations and distributing patronage to their members. Conceptualizing the expected credit risk 
behavior of cooperatives over time and responses to exogenous favorable and adverse factors 
offer useful insight to cooperative managers. 
The objective of this thesis is to assess the historical evolution of agricultural cooperative 
credit risk. This will be done by studying the credit rating migration behavior of cooperatives 
using Markov chains. This research uses proprietary cooperative financial statement data of 155 
cooperatives spanning from 1996 to 2014. The Credit Metrics component of Moody’s Global 
Agricultural Cooperatives Industry Rating Methodology is used to assign annual credit ratings. 
Unconditional transition probabilities and probabilities conditioned on the type of cooperative, 
the state of the economy, and the performance of the agricultural sector are estimated to compare 
differences in migration behavior. Non-Markovian behavior and time-heterogeneity are also 
examined. 
Cooperatives are more likely to experience a change in credit rating in the next period 
than remain unchanged. When the direction of the rating change is considered, cooperatives are 
more likely to be upgraded than downgraded. However, more annual instances of downgrades 
exceeding upgrades are observed across the sample. There are numerous instances where 
downgrades and upgrades span multiple rating classes. This occurs because cooperatives are 
  
often small and not diversified enough to withstand adverse challenges to their operations. 
Rating history impacts the direction of the subsequent rating change. Cooperatives that were 
previously unchanged in the prior period are more likely to retain their rating in the next, while 
those previously upgraded are more likely to be downgraded, and those previously downgraded 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 1.1 Cooperative Credit Risk 
The beginning of the new millennium saw the continuation of the decline in profitability 
of agricultural cooperatives. According to cooperative managers, the notable issues that plagued 
cooperatives during that period included the decline in commodity prices, the state of the 
agricultural economy, operational challenges, and increased costs (Gray & Kraenzle, 2002). In 
addition, inter-cooperative coordination costs had risen, members were increasingly more 
heterogenous, and the industry had become more competitive (Bond, 2006). Many of the 
aforementioned drivers were industry effects, meaning they impacted all cooperatives belonging 
to the farm supply and grain marketing industry (Boyd, Boland, Dhuyvetter, & Barton, 2007).  
In 2002, Agway and Farmland Industries filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Since then, 
bankruptcy events have been rare and cooperative profitability has rebounded. Although times 
have been good for cooperatives, history does repeat itself and profitability will become a topic 
of interest again since cycles are a perpetual facet of agriculture. Risk presents itself in many 
forms and varies in intensity from period to period making it difficult to mitigate. Credit risk is 
of particular importance to lenders, managers, and directors. Cooperatives are highly leveraged 
as a result of limited access to public equity markets and the need to return allocated equity to 
members; their tendency to narrowly focus on a specific type of commodity, region, or level of 
the marketing channel contributes to their relatively high business risk (Manfredo & Richards, 
2016). Conceptualizing the expected credit risk behavior of cooperatives over time and responses 
to exogenous favorable and adverse factors offers insight to those interested in cooperatives. 
The objective of this thesis is to assess the historical evolution of cooperative credit risk. 
This will be done by studying the credit rating migration behavior of cooperatives using Markov 
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chains. This research uses proprietary cooperative financial statement data provided by CoBank 
of 155 cooperatives spanning from 1996 to 2014. The sample data is restricted from 1996 to 
2013, and 2014 observations are held and used for out-of-sample forecast evaluation. We use the 
Credit Metrics component of Moody’s Global Agricultural Cooperatives Industry Rating 
Methodology to assign annual credit ratings. The Credit Metrics component is used to assess a 
cooperative’s financial risk. We then estimate unconditional transition probabilities from the 
entire sample and vary the time horizon to assess credit migration behavior. Sub-samples 
conditioned on the type of cooperative, the state of the economy, and the performance of the 
agricultural sector are created and models estimated to compare differences in migration 
behavior. Rating drift and rating activity is calculated to assess the trends in credit quality across 
the sample in addition to rating magnitude. Coefficients of variation and standard errors of the 
estimates are calculated to measure precision and reliability and the L2 Norm is used to detect 
regime change. The estimated transition probabilities are initially assumed to be time-dependent 
and time-homogenous. However, the literature has found evidence of non-Markovian behavior 
and the violation of time-homogeneity. Consequently, the impact of these ‘time’ assumptions on 
all samples are tested using the Pearson 𝜒2 and the Likelihood Ratio tests. 
The average cooperative in the 1996 to 2013 sample has a prime rating of Baa. Of the 
2,790 cooperative years, 75.9% are rated prime, and 24.1% are not rated prime. When the letter 
grade is considered, only 117 (4.19%) are rated Aaa, the highest possible rating, and 61 (2.19%) 
are rated Caa, the lowest possible rating. Based on credit migration behavior over the sample, 
cooperatives are more likely to experience a change in credit rating in the next period than 
remain unchanged. When the direction of the rating change is considered, the total frequency of 
upgrades was higher than downgrades. However, when annual observations are considered, there 
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are more instances of downgrades exceeding upgrades from 1996 to 2013. On average, 10.2% of 
cooperatives change from prime to not prime in credit quality and 10.9% change from not prime 
to prime. There are many instances whereby downgrades and upgrades span across multiple 
rating classes. This occurs because cooperatives are small and not diversified enough to 
withstand adverse challenges to their operations. The rating history impacts the direction of the 
subsequent rating change. Cooperatives that were previously unchanged in the prior period are 
more likely to retain their rating in the next period. While those previously upgraded are more 
likely to be downgraded. And, those previously downgraded are more likely to be upgraded. We 
find that the rating process does not follow a first-order Markov chain. 
 1.2 Thesis Objectives 
The main objective of this study is to assess the credit rating migration behavior of the 
risk of agricultural cooperatives. Using Moody’s “Credit Metrics” Ratings, this study attempts to 
answer the following questions: 
• How has the credit quality of cooperatives evolved from 1996 to 2013? 
• Given an initial rating, are cooperatives more likely to be upgraded or 
downgraded? 
• Is rating stability dependent on credit quality?  
• Are future ratings dependent on rating history? 
• Is the credit rating migration process a First-order Markov chain?  
 1.3 Thesis Outline 
This thesis is comprised of six chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the literature concerning the 
credit migration approach, characteristics of migration matrices, challenges to the Markov 
property and time-homogeneity assumptions, and their respective statistical test procedures. 
4 
Chapter 3 outlines the methodology of assigning credit ratings, assessing migration behavior, and 
the tests used. Chapter 4 describes the data used in this study and provides summary statistics. 
Chapter 5 states the results of the analysis. Chapter 6 provides conclusions and implications for 
lenders, and cooperative managers and directors. 
  
5 
Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
 2.1 The Role and Importance of Credit Ratings 
Information asymmetry and adverse selection are age-old problems in debt markets. 
Without addressing these issues, investors experience high search costs in identifying debt 
instruments that match their risk profile. Credit ratings are simply assessments of the obligor’s 
repayment ability and consist of subjective and objective components, providing investors with a 
comprehensive evaluation of an obligor and/or obligation. The United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) established the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations (NRSRO) in 1975. Members of this body are registered with the SEC and 
consequently recognized as having authority on credit quality assessments. Notable members of 
the NRSRO are “The Big Three”, Moody’s Investors Service, Standard & Poor’s Global Ratings 
(S&P), and Fitch Ratings. Rating agencies rate the entity—corporations and countries—in 
addition to the debt instruments they issue. Although their rating scales differ, rating classes are 
comparable across rating agencies. 
 2.2 Components of Credit Ratings 
Ratings assigned by agencies such as Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s are a complex 
judgmental process (Nickell, Perraudin, & Varotto, 2000). A number of resources are collected 
pertaining to an obligor or obligation. Multiple aspects are considered to provide an overall 
assessment of repayment ability. Credit ratings consist of objective and subjective components 
since “fundamental credit analysis incorporates an evaluation of franchise value, financial 
statement analysis, and management quality” (J. Fons, Cantor, & Mahoney, 2002). Although 
they are useful in credit risk analysis for investors, they are not intended to capture a specific 
likelihood of default over a specific time horizon (Wang, Ding, Pan, & Malone, 2017). 
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Time is an important consideration in evaluating credit quality and the methodology used 
results in significantly different conclusions. Assessments can either be based on through-the-
cycle (TTC) or point-in-time (PIT) methods. PIT parameters consider all relevant, current-state 
conditions affecting an obligor making it short-term in scope. PIT measures have the 
characteristics of being timely in reflecting market conditions but are unstable and procyclical 
(Wang et al., 2017). TTC values are concerned with the long-term to such an extent that the 
estimated parameters are independent of cyclical effects such as the business cycle or interest 
rates. Moreover, credit ratings published by agencies aim to reflect perceived permanent (long-
term) components of changes in credit quality (Altman & Rijken, 2004). According to Cantor 
and Mann (2003), the objective of Moody’s is to provide “accurate relative (i.e., ordinal) ranking 
of credit risk at each point in time, without reference to an explicit time horizon”. 
Observations on the challenges and impact of objective and subjective components are 
discussed in the literature. Featherstone, Wilson, Kastens, and Jones (2007) primarily studied the 
challenges lenders face when evaluating the creditworthiness of farm borrowers. The borrower’s 
character, financial record keeping, productive standing, Fair Isaac credit bureau score, and 
credit risk were considered. Characteristics of the loan officer and the financial institution were 
also considered. They found the non-financial factors, character and the Fair Isaac credit bureau 
score, had a significant impact on the proportion of loans approved. In addition, they found the 
experience of the loan officer and the time they spent on agricultural loans had a significant 
impact on the proportion of loans approved in Kansas and Indiana. 
Gloy et al. (2005) found that subjective components such as a borrower’s character, 
commitment to repay, management capacity, and future business prospects have a stabilizing 
effect on credit risk ratings since factors such as character and management are unlikely to 
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experience sudden or frequent changes, however, when perceived, substantial changes likely 
ensue. Unsurprisingly, the authors found that ratings based solely on current and historical 
records had a higher likelihood of being unstable. Interestingly, stability matters in the debt 
market. 
Fons et al. (2002) found that investors prefer ratings stability and reject the notion of 
ratings that are more frequently updated. Stability is desired on account of investors wanting to 
minimize the costliness of portfolio rebalancing (Altman & Rijken, 2004). Huang, Levy, 
Pospisil, Hong, and Srivastava (2016) acknowledge that even though PIT parameters are more 
reflective of the current state of the economy, risk measures such as economic capital and 
unexpected loss becomes more volatile as a result of frequent updates. Clearly, those that benefit 
from rating stability are bond investors. The same cannot be said for all the issuers the rating 
agencies evaluate. 
Although it may be true that subjective components provide stability, issuers may seem to 
be at odds with the slowness of updating ratings, an obvious consequence of stability. Survey 
results in a report by the Association for Financial Professionals (2002) indicated that a third of 
issuers held the view that assigned ratings were inaccurate, noting that 40% believed agencies 
were not timely in updating ratings in response to changes in financial quality, and the majority 
believed when compared to upgrades, downgrades occurred at a faster pace. The timeliness of 
credit changes is impactful to issuers since borrowing costs are a function of their rating. The 
longer an issuer stays in a lower credit quality class, the longer they are subject to higher 
borrowing costs. 
In addition to their lack of timeliness, rating agencies have received several complaints 
over the years most notably regarding their rating methodologies. Their methodologies are of 
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interest to the public and in order to be more transparent are regularly published. Unfortunately, 
the construction of subjective components inherent in the published ratings are difficult to 
discern yet alone model, even with an articulated rating methodology. According to Nickell et al. 
(2000), one cannot be sure if the resulting probability distribution modeled is similar to those a 
rating agency might produce since the credit risk categories used are explicitly non-quantitative 
and are not directly linked to likelihoods of default. This is demonstrated in their unusual results 
of their model for Japan and the United Kingdom as they did not contain probabilities of 
downgrades into non-investment grades or default. Therefore, credit rating methodologies should 
not be regarded as precise since they rely on the judgement and experience of the agencies 
(Crouhy, Galai, & Mark, 2001). 
 2.3 The Credit Migration Approach 
The value of using the credit migration approach is that it results in a comprehensive 
perspective on credit risk and loan losses than relying solely on the measurement of historic 
default rates (Barry, Escalante, & Ellinger, 2002). Credit migration approaches can vary in 
complexity, but their applications are broad. Early finance applications of credit migration 
conducted by Cyert, R., & Thompson, G. (1968) illustrate the theory’s usefulness whereby they 
developed a model that allowed a firm to better discern credit risk and improve controls in the 
issuance of credit cards. With the passage of time, Markov chain applications were used to assess 
portfolio risk (Altman & Kao, 1992a; Belkin, Suchower, & Jr, 1998; L. V. Carty & Fons, 1993; 
Duffee, 1998; J. S. Fons, 1994; Helwege & Turner, 1999; Lucas & Lonski, 1992) and valuing 
credit derivatives and instruments (Bielecki & Rutkowski, 2000; Jarrow, Lando, & Turnbull, 
1997; Kijima & Komoribayashi, 1998; Lando, 1998, 2000). Unfortunately, the proprietary nature 
of loan data, small portfolios, and the tendency for lenders to change their rating methodologies 
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within the agricultural sector have resulted in the limited number of credit migration studies 
(Gloy et al., 2005). 
The common, underlying assumptions imposed to derive credit migration matrices in the 
literature are that the stochastic process is a First-order Markovian and time-homogenous. A 
Markov chain that is first-order means that the current state of the system is only dependent on 
the last period’s state. A first-order Markov chain that is time-homogenous has a probability 
distribution that does not change over time. This property is also known as stationarity. 
 2.4 Estimating Credit Migration Matrices 
Anderson and Goodman (1957) found that transition probabilities calculated from the 
entire sample to be Maximum Likelihood Estimators. They found them to be consistent but 
biased. However, they found the bias tended to zero as the sample size increased. 
Estimated probabilities can be compared to observed probabilities from the sample data 
to determine the accuracy of the prediction. Altman and Kao (1991) measured the predictive 
ability of their models as deviations from the estimated values. They found that their models’ 
predictive ability worsened over time, that is, they are best at estimating distributions within 
shorter periods. They state that it is unacceptable to make predictions from the sample data as it 
creates a self-fulfilling prophecy and suggest the results be back tested or predictions be 
compared with out-of-sample observations. 
Bangia et al. (2002) found diagonal elements to be the most accurate and observed an 
increase in variation the further away one moved from the diagonal by computing coefficients of 
variation to represent the level of uncertainty. Nickell et al. (2000) calculated the standard errors 
of each probability to show the precision of the estimates. According to Jones (2005), datasets 
provided by credit rating agencies suffer from survivor bias if failed assets are excluded resulting 
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in inaccurate estimates. However, he states that a “survivors” transition matrix can be estimated 
on a consistent basis if it is not feasible to observe defaults. 
At times an estimated transition matrix will not yield similar results to those found in 
literature. “The nature and extent of the problems encountered will be a function of the particular 
rating system, the number of grades considered, and the amount of historical data available” 
(J.P.Morgan, 1997). Prominent rating agencies use modifiers, numeric (1, 2, & 3) in the case of 
Moody’s Investors Service while S&P uses a plus (+) or minus (-), to add granularity and show 
the credit quality of an issuer within a rating class. Unfortunately, such granularity does not lend 
itself well to estimating transition matrices. The number of observations within low credit rating 
categories with modifiers is not sufficient; the small sample size has a negative impact on 
statistical inference, and therefore, the industry standard is to publish transition matrices without 
rating modifiers (Bangia et al., 2002). 
Another modeling complication is the pace of change in credit quality when dealing with 
continuous-time rating observations provided by rating agencies. According to Jones (2005), 
credit quality may respond too slowly to changes in the economy making the first-order Markov 
chain too restrictive. He suggests using a longer time horizon or higher-order Markov chain, but 
the limitation is that it requires a rich dataset. On the other hand, credit quality may respond 
quickly to changes in the economy, but observations aren’t made at the same pace (Jones, 2005). 
A notable period was during the Great Recession in which the “Big Three” failed to provide 
sufficient credit quality updates on securitized debt instruments. In the same vein, Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations failed to predict the defaults of Enron and 
Worldcom. Moreover, the literature indicates that most bond or stock price changes occur prior 
to the actual rating change announcement (Altman & Kao, 1991). 
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 2.5 Migration Rate Behavior 
A credit migration matrix has a few characteristics worth mentioning. An expectation is 
that there is a rank order of transition probabilities as follows: 
1. Higher quality credit ratings are not correlated with a higher likelihood of default; 
2. The greater the difference between two rating classes i.e. migration distance, the 
lower the likelihood of transition; 
3. The smaller the difference between two rating classes (notches), the higher the 
likelihood of transition (J.P.Morgan, 1997). 
The rank order gives rise to the term monotonicity that describes the declining transition 
probability the further two states are from each other. Violations to the rule may occur in the 
event of default however, since default is an absorbing state and probabilities accumulate over 
time, an exception can be made (Berd, 2005). Bangia et al. (2002) found additional violations to 
monocity and attributed the results to “intra-interval rating activity omissions inherent in longer 
transition horizons” and “noise in the underlying data”. Nickell et al. (2000) observed that the 
distribution of probabilities in their study varied with the business cycle, along with the industry 
the obligor belonged to, and the elapsed time since debt issuance. 
There is a “high probability load on the diagonal” indicating that borrowers have a high 
likelihood of maintaining their current rating (Bangia et al., 2002). Therefore, it is expected to 
observe the highest probabilities of the matrix concentrated in the diagonal followed by 
neighboring probabilities. These diagonal elements are conventionally known as retention rates. 
Volatility is the likelihood that an entity fails to retain their rating in the next period whereas 
stability is the opposite in definition. Using a Moody’s dataset spanning from 1970-1997 
consisting of 6,534 obligors, Nickell et al. (2000) found a 90% retention rate for obligors rated 
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Aaa and Aa, 85.7% for Ba rated issuers, 83.0% for B, and 66.6% for Caa. They concluded that 
volatility increased as credit quality declined. According to Jorion, Shi and Zhang (2005), 
notable differences in the stability of transition probabilities of investment and speculative rated 
issuers were found to have been attributed to “differences in the value relevance of accounting 
data and in earnings management”. 
Barry, Escalante, and Ellinger (2002) applied the migration approach to farm-level data 
from the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management Association (FBFM) by observing the 
historic movement of farmers’ credit scores derived from a five-class model developed by Splett, 
Barry, Dixon, & Ellinger (1994) and other performance measures under different time-average 
approaches. Consistent with empirical results, “the frequencies are highest for remaining in the 
same class, the rates decline for movements to more distant classes, and the incidence of 
downgrading tends to exceed the occurrence of upgrading” (Barry et al., 2002). 
Escalante, Barry, Park, and Demir (2004) utilized a probit regression to determine the 
factors that significantly impact the probability of farm credit migration rates. Transition 
probabilities were obtained from the five-class model developed by Splett et al. (1994) and a ten-
class rating model recommended under the Basel Accord. Class 1 represented the lowest risk 
borrowers in the five-class model, subsequent classes represented increasing credit risk, and 
Class 5 represented default. Similar to the results of Barry et al. (2002), Escalante et al. (2004) 
found retention rates to be highest for Class 1 borrowers, middle lower credit risk classes 
diminished, and borrowers that belonged to Class 5 slightly increased. Retention rates under the 
ten-class model were found to be significantly lower than those in the five-class model. Carty 
(1997) states that finer gradation in the rating scale results in higher volatility since small 
changes in credit quality are more likely be captured. As observed in the five-class model of 
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Escalante et al. (2004), Class 1 of the ten-class model exhibited the highest retention rates 
relative to other classes. However, unlike the findings of Nickell et al. (2000) and Carty (1997), 
retention rates did not decrease monotonically with decreasing credit quality in both the five-
class and ten-class models. 
Altman and Kao (1992b) studied the behavior of bonds issued in the 1970–1988 period. 
They were interested in observing the significance of the initial rating and the resulting 
probability distribution. They found bonds initially rated A and higher were more likely to be 
downgraded than upgraded. Within 10 years of issuance, 40–80% of initially rated BB bonds and 
higher were expected to experience at least one transition, and bonds rated A were more stable 
than AAA. The lowest quality rated in the dataset were BB-rated and unsurprisingly were found 
to be the most unstable. All bonds with an initial credit classes belonging to the investment grade 
subset had a higher likelihood of downgrade except for those rated BBB and no pattern was 
observed for non-investment grade bonds. 
Altman and Kao (1991) found that retention rates declined as the investment horizon 
increased implying increased volatility. Carty and Fons (1993) found Baa rated issuers were 
more likely to be upgraded than downgraded for time horizons greater than one year. Higher 
rated issuers were more stable than riskier issuers and exhibited a lower probability of default (L. 
V. Carty, 1997; Figlewski, Frydman, & Liang, 2012). However, Carty and Fons (1993) state that 
the highest rated issuers’ likelihood of downgrade eventually increases with the time horizon 
because they cannot be upgraded any further. In a study by Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay (1998), 
average credit ratings for investment grade issuers from 1978 to 1995 decreased but these 
findings were attributed to tightening credit standards. Carty and Fons (1993) found that net 
downgrades exceeded net upgrades for Aa and A rated classes for a one-year, two-year, five-year 
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and 10-year horizons. They also found issuers rated Baa to have an approximately equal 
likelihood of an upgraded or downgrade, but issuers rated B were more likely to be upgraded 
than Ba. Interestingly, Carty and Fons (1993) observed Caa-rated issuers were more likely to 
default on account of being “too weak to make the uphill climb”, a significant contrast to the 
results of Lucas and Lonski (1992) who found the proximity of the Ca and C rating to the default 
state resulted in more stable probabilities. 
 2.6 Challenges to the Markov Property Assumption 
There is ample evidence in the literature of the Markov property and time-homogeneity 
being violated. Nickell et al. (2000) found probability distributions to be dependent on the stage 
of the business cycle and industry sector. One may control for the stages of the business cycle 
and still observe non-Markovian behavior. Frydman and Schuermann (2008) found that despite 
two firms having identical current ratings, they can have markedly different probability 
distributions and non-Markovian behavior still persists after controlling for the business cycle or 
industry sector. Additional sources to non-Markovian behavior have been identified in the 
literature. This study will focus on path dependence, industry sector, and fallen angel events. 
 2.6.1 Path Dependence 
According to Carty and Fons (1993) “prior rating changes carry predictive power for the 
direction of future rating changes”. This is known as rating momentum or path dependence. It is 
the observation that last period’s rating has some bearing on the direction of transition in the 
following period. 
Before discussing path dependence further, the term rating drift and its variation in 
definition in the literature are discussed. Rating drift is defined as how ratings change over time 
(Altman & Kao, 1991, 1992a, 1992b; Altman & Rijken, 2004) where migration rates are 
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compared under differing time horizons. Rating drift overestimates “the performance of 
individual bonds and the whole portfolio under some assumed yield curve changes.” (Altman & 
Kao, 1991). This definition is different to that of Carty (1997) who calculates “annual rating 
drift” by summing the total number of upgrades—weighted by the number of ratings changed per 
upgrade—per year less total number of downgrades— weighted by the number of ratings 
changed per upgrade—per year, divided by the total number of non-defaulted obligors at risk of 
a rating change during the period. According to Carty (1997), changes in rating drift indicate a 
change in the credit quality of a portfolio as a percentage of one rating per issuer. If the 
calculated rating drift is positive, then the portfolio improved in quality while a negative rating 
drift is a deterioration in quality. Lando and Skødeberg (2002) define rating drift as the current 
rating’s dependence on the previous rating. In their study, rating drift is equivalent to rating 
momentum. 
Rating momentum was observed and discussed in Carty and Fons (1993). However, 
Lando and Skødeberg (2002) were critical of how they addressed non-Markovian behavior. 
Carty and Fons (1993) tested two hypotheses; the first being that within one year there is no 
upward rating momentum and the second is that there is no downward rating momentum. Rating 
momentum is conditioned on the current period having the same direction as the prior. They 
failed to reject the no upward momentum hypothesis at the 5% level of confidence except for the 
B rated category and rejected the no downward momentum at the 5% level of confidence at all 
rating categories. That is, “a downgraded issuer is more prone to a subsequent downgrade within 
one year than an upgrade” (L. V. Carty & Fons, 1993). 
According to Lando and Skødeberg (2002), what Carty and Fons (1993) failed to account 
for is that the nature of a Markov chain suggests that probabilities across rating classes could be 
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higher for downgrades than upgrades and that the distinction that ought to be made is the 
direction taken to arrive at the current state not the departure from the current. They believe that 
rating momentum observed in their study was likely a function of the rating grade concentration 
of firms in the sample since observations concentrated in investment grade ratings would have 
different results than a sample with a concentration of firms that were non-investment grade. 
They suggest testing the rating behavior of obligors with specific ratings to those of obligors that 
arrived at their current credit rating through an upgrade or downgrade. 
In a study by Figlewski et al. (2012), path dependence was observed as previously 
downgraded firms were found to have a higher likelihood to experience a further downgrade and 
to default than an equally-rated firm that had not experienced downgrade in the prior period. 
Similarly, Altman and Kao (1992b) found a pattern of a downgrade to be followed by a second 
downgrade in the two sub-periods of the data sample but no presence of path dependence when 
an upgrade initially occurred. 
Bangia et al. (2002) evaluated three momentum matrices—upward, downward and 
maintain—against the unconditional matrix and found downgrade probabilities of the downward 
momentum matrix to be larger than their corresponding elements in the unconditional matrix 
while downgrade probabilities of the upward momentum matrix were smaller. They also found 
the upgrade probabilities of the upward momentum matrix for non-investment grade credit 
classes to be higher than their corresponding elements in the unconditional matrix, while 
investment grade credit classes were lower. 
 2.6.2 Industry Sector 
In their study, Nickell et al. (2000) constructed a matrix conditioned on industry—
Banking versus Industrial—and found banks’ probabilities to be less stable than those of 
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industrials since the retention rate for banks were lower for all rating classes. They calculated t-
statistics at a 5% level and compared their conditional matrix to the unconditional and found 
approximately half the estimates for banks to be statistically significant and in addition, found 
that estimates for industrials were generally similar. Similarly, Altman and Kao (1991) found 
that bonds belonging to the industrial sector were more stable than non-industrials. 
 2.6.3 Fallen Angels 
Fallen angels are issuers that are downgraded from investment grade to speculative (non-
investment) grade. Fallen angels have markedly different probability distributions to their 
equally-rated peers (Figlewski et al., 2012; Mann, Hamilton, Varma, & Cantor, 2003). Emery 
and Gates (2014) found 42% of fallen angel events were attributed to company specific factors 
and 30% to industry stress. Furthermore, they found the median downgrade due to leveraged 
acquisitions fell five rating classes compared to the one to two class fall for all other reasons. 
According to Mann et al. (2003) relative to equally-rated, non-investment grade debt, 
fallen angels have longer maturities, larger debt size, smaller coupons, and fewer covenants. In 
the first two years after being downgraded, fallen angels were found to have a higher likelihood 
of default and a lower likelihood to be upgraded to investment grade relative to equally-rated 
non-investment grade issuers but their investment profile improved better than non-investment 
grade issuers as time progressed (Mann et al., 2003). 
The initial rating assigned to a fallen angel has a bearing on the transition probability; the 
lower the initial assigned rating the more likely the firm will default, and the higher the initial 
assigned rating, the higher the likelihood of returning to an investment grade rating (Emery & 
Gates, 2014; Mann et al., 2003). Of the 477 fallen angels studied by Emery and Gates (2014) 
spanning a period from 1999–2003, 39% remained in the non-investment grade rating, 28% 
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upgraded to investment grade, 15% defaulted, and 18% of the firms had their ratings withdrawn. 
Furthermore, they observed a spike in frequency of fallen angel events during the 2001–2002 
period but surprising, there was no similar run-up during the 2008 Financial Crisis, but they 
believe it was likely explained by the fact that the firms were non-financial entities, in addition to 
increased risk-taking and liquidity as a result of Quantitative Easing (QE) (Emery & Gates, 
2014). 
 2.7 Challenges to the Time-Homogeneity Assumption 
In addition to the Markov property being violated, there are examples in the literature of 
time-heterogeneity. The violation of time-homogeneity can be attributed to the sampling process. 
“Markov chains are not usually stationary, in the sense that the joint distribution of N successive 
observations may be different depending on where they are taken”(Kiefer & Larson, 2007). The 
transition estimates may be significantly different depending on the period length of the sample 
(Altman & Kao, 1991). This cannot easily be addressed by taking a sample that spans a longer 
time period. This is because longer time periods have a higher risk of regime change 
(Bickenbach & Bode, 2003). Longer time periods are more likely to capture numerous events 
such as industry specific and systemic incidents, natural disasters, governmental policy changes, 
and the business cycle as demonstrated by Nickell et al. (2000). These events would undoubtedly 
influence credit migration behavior. Controlling for them would be difficult let alone identifying 
them individually. The consequence of not identifying time-inhomogeneity in a sample is that 
the estimates will not be a true prediction of the future distribution of ratings (Altman & Kao, 
1992b). 
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 2.7.1 The Business Cycle 
It is important to examine a period that covers various economic conditions since the 
variance of default rates are a function of economic conditions; recessions beget higher 
frequencies of defaults while expansions decrease them (Jorion et al., 2005). Moreover, the 
failure to do so yields probabilities that are sensitive to the sample period chosen and are not 
representative of a given transition (Jones, 2005). Helwege and Kleiman (1997) found that a 
downturn economy leads to a higher frequency of defaults. A higher prevalence of defaults can 
be explained by the idea that firms operating in a recessionary environment may find their ability 
to generate profits impaired which impacts their ability to pay its bondholders (Helwege & 
Kleiman, 1997). 
Nickell et al. (2000) categorized their sample years into economic activity levels “peak”, 
“normal times”, and “trough” for G7 and non-G7 countries that corresponded to the sample’s 
recorded real GDP growth rate—upper, middle, or lower third. They found investment grade 
bonds were significantly more stable in “peak” periods and stability deteriorated in “troughs”. In 
addition, their results indicate the likely effect of the business cycle on investment grade issuers 
was a decrease in stability rather than an increased likelihood of downgrade and that default 
probabilities “depend strongly on the stage of the business cycle”. 
Bangia et al. (2002) estimated conditional and unconditional ratings transition matrices 
whereby conditional matrices were conditioned on the stage of the business cycle and 
unconditional matrices were averaged across all stages of the cycle. Conditional transition 
matrices indicated significant differences in the loss distribution of credit portfolios. Their 
resulting downgrade transition probabilities were higher but more stable during recessionary 
periods and lower for upgrades. 
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2.8 Testing the Assumptions 
The assumptions of Markovian behavior and time-homogeneity are important “because 
loans prior to maturity can be substituted by new loans with the same rating and the rating 
quality can be expected to develop in a similar manner” (Weissbach, Tschiersch, & Lawrenz, 
2009). This illuminates the importance of testing and confirming the assumptions. An incorrect 
estimated distribution results in incorrect predictions about the future. In as much as these 
assumptions make modeling credit risk simple, and hence their popularity, they are restrictive, 
unrealistic, and likely to be violated (Kiefer & Larson, 2007). 
The reliability of estimated transition probabilities requires the data-generating process to 
be Markovian and the estimates be based on a sufficiently large number of observations 
(Bickenbach & Bode, 2003). They state that a violation of the Markov property and time-
homogeneity results in the inability to derive an accurate stationary distribution and secondly, 
insufficient observations result in inaccurate probabilities reflected by high standard errors. Tan 
and Yılmaz (2002) state that even if the process is confirmed to be first-order dependent it cannot 
be assumed to be time-homogenous. Moreover, they state that if the process is time-
inhomogeneous then the Markov chain has no predictive power. Therefore, testing both 
assumptions is required to conclude that the rating process is a first-order Markov chain.  
Time-inhomogeneity can be tested by calculating cell-by-cell distances, L1 Norm and L2 
Norm (Euclidean Distance), comparing annual matrices to the entire sample’s average transition 
matrix (Gunnvald, 2014; Jafry & Schuermann, 2004; Trück & Rachev, 2011). Unfortunately, the 
two metrics “only provide a relative comparison between two matrices” because one is unable to 
determine which of the two is larger nor interpret the magnitude of the resulting Euclidian 
distance (Jafry & Schuermann, 2004).  
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Anderson and Goodman (1957) were some of the early contributors of statistical tests for 
testing the assumptions of a Markov chain. They applied the Likelihood Ratio and Pearson 𝜒2 
tests on the following hypotheses:  
(a) the estimates of the first-order chain were time-homogeneous; 
(b) if they were time-homogenous, then were they specified numbers; 
(c) and whether the stochastic process is a u-th order Markov chain against the 
alternative hypothesis that it is an r-th but not u-th order (Anderson & Goodman, 
1957). 
Following the principles outlined by Anderson and Goodman (1957), Bickenbach and 
Bode (2003) tested time-homogeneity by dividing their entire sample into mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive sub-periods and compared the estimates of the sub-periods to those of the entire 
sample. They used the Likelihood Ratio and Pearson 𝜒2 tests to evaluate the hypothesis that the 
probabilities from the sub-periods were equal to those in the entire sample.   
Tan and Yılmaz (2002) tested two sequential orders at a time to evaluate the order of the 
Markov chain. The hypothesis was that the estimates were equal. They began by comparing the 
zero-order Markov chain to the first-order Markov chain. If that test was rejected, then the 
conclusion would be that the process was not a zero-order Markov chain. They then compare the 
first-order Markov chain to the second-order Markov chain. If the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected, then one can conclude that the stochastic process was a first-order Markov chain. 
 2.9 Summary of the Literature 
The literature suggests that the subjective component of credit ratings have a stabilizing 
effect on ratings and this characteristic is demanded by investors. Retention rates were found to 
most likely have the highest probability in a migration matrix and were observed to decrease 
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with time. Transition probabilities were also found to vary with the business cycle and with the 
industry the obligor belonged to. Non-Markovian behavior such as path dependence, and fallen 
angel events, including non-stationarity have been identified in studies. The literature provides 
statistical methods to test the Markov property and stationarity. It also provides estimates such as 
the standard error and coefficient of variation for measuring the accuracy of the transition 
probabilities. Many of the concepts summarized in the literature review are yet to be 
comprehensively considered and applied to agricultural cooperatives. This study contributes to 
the literature by assessing the credit rating migration behavior of agricultural cooperatives. 
  
23 
Chapter 3 - Methods 
 3.1 Moody’s Global Agricultural Cooperatives Industry Rating Methodology 
Founded in 1909, Moody’s is a respected and authoritative institution in the credit rating 
industry. This study follows Moody’s Rating Methodology: Global Agricultural Cooperatives 
Industry (2010) to assign annual credit ratings for each cooperative in the sample. Credit quality 
assessments published by rating agencies have subjective and objective components. Although 
Moody’s methodology offers detailed illustrations of the evaluation methods and considerations 
made when rating a cooperative, it is unlikely that this study could produce an assessment 
identical to that of one produced by Moody’s. The inability to follow the complete Moody’s 
methodology is because the subjective components of the rating methodology cannot be created. 
For this reason, this study only makes use of the objective component in the rating methodology 
titled Credit Metrics. 
 3.1.1 Moody’s Overall Rating Process 
Moody’s (2010) credit assessments are based on four broad rating factors: 
1. Scale and diversification 
2. Franchise strength and growth potential 
3. Financial flexibility 
4. Financial strategy and Credit Metrics 
Table 3.1 shows Moody’s Rating Grid. It consists of the rating factors, the sub-factors, and their 
respective weights that are used in determining the overall rating a cooperative receives. 
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Table 3.1 Rating Grid: Factors, Sub-factors, and Weights 
RATING FACTORS  SUB-FACTORS  WEIGHTING 
CUMULATIVE SUB-
FACTOR WEIGHTING 
1. Scale and 
Diversification 
a) Total Sales (USD Billion) 5.00% 
25.00% 
b) Geographic Diversification – Sales 
Sales Concentration to a Single Market Region 
5.00% And 
Sales to Developed Market Regions 
c) Geographic Diversification – Raw Materials Supply 
Concentration from a Single Producing Region 
5.00% 
d) Segmental Diversification 10.00% 
2. Franchise Strength 
and Growth Potential 
a) Market Share 5.00% 
20.00% b) Organic Volume Growth 5.00% 
c) Qualitative Assessment of Portfolio 10.00% 
3. Financial 
Flexibility 
a) Willingness and Ability to Reduce Member 
Payments; Relative Size of Member Payments 
10.00% 10.00% 
4. Financial Strategy 
and Credit Metrics 
a) Financial Strategy 5.00% 
45.00% 
b) Debt / Coop EBITDA 10.00% 
c) Coop RCF / Net Debt 10.00% 
d) Coop EBITA / Interest Expense 10.00% 
e) (Coop RCF-Capex) / Debt 10.00% 
Total  100.00% 100.00% 
Note. Reprinted from “Rating Methodology: Global Agricultural Cooperatives Industry” 
by Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s Investors Service, 2010). 
Each rating factor consists of sub-factors. Credit Metrics is the only objective rating 
factor and it consists of four sub-factors. They are: 
1. Debt / Cooperative Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization 
(EBITDA)  
2. Cooperative Retained Cash Flow (RCF) / Net Debt  
3. Cooperative Earnings Before Interest and Taxes and Amortization (EBITA) / Interest 
Expense  
4. Cooperative RCF less Capital Expenditures / Debt  
These credit metrics are a gauge of financial quality and are believed to be the most 
important in assessing financial credit risk (Moody’s Investors Service, 2010). 
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Moody’s defines the four credit metrics as: 
Debt / Cooperative Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization 
(EBITDA) reflects operating cash flow available for debt service before interest. This 
ratio remains a key ratio utilized by speculative-grade investors, but has limitations for 
credit analysis because it does not reflect capital spending or working capital 
requirements. In addition, the EBITDA measure does not take into account exceptional 
items below the EBITDA line that could impact cash flow. 
Cooperative Retained Cash Flow (RCF) / Net Debt: Retained Cash Flow examines 
operating cash flow before working capital changes but after all cash payments to and 
contributions from members. This metric reflects the cash generation ability of the 
business relative to debt burden, regardless of how management chooses to distribute 
cash payments to cooperative members. Thus, RCF reflects all member cash distributions 
and receipts including produce payments (COGS), net earnings paid in cash (dividends), 
equity retains (share issuances) and retirements of equity (share buybacks). 
Cooperative Earnings Before Interest and Taxes and Amortization (EBITA) / 
Interest Expense is a debt service measure which has a major advantage: its takes 
seasonality into account. This is particularly important in assessing companies that tend 
to reduce debt solely at year-end for balance sheet presentation purposes, or that end their 
financial reporting year when debt is at its annual low-point. The major drawback of this 
measure is that interest expense may vary according to the date of debt issuance or the 
mix of fixed or floating rate debt instruments. 
Cooperative RCF less Capital Expenditures / Debt assesses sustainable debt 
repayment capacity prior to working capital movements. Paradoxically, speculative-grade 
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issuers may have relatively high free cash flow metrics compared to their investment-
grade counterparts as they tend have weaker franchises with mandatory debt reduction 
schedules and less ability to withstand business challenges. (Moody’s Investors Service, 
2010, p. 17). 
 3.1.2 Calculating the Credit Metrics 
Moody’s makes two important accounting adjustments when calculating credit metrics. 
The adjustments are necessary for the purposes of consistency and comparison. First, Moody’s 
estimates are based on a cooperative’s ability and willingness to lower patronage and adds it 
back to gross margin. The add-back value ranges from 0% to 7%. According to Moody’s (2010) 
the add-back value does not exceed 7% since reducing patronage by more than 7% disrupts 
membership stability. However, the process in determining the value is subjective therefore it is 
assumed that the add-back value for all cooperatives is 5% for the purposes of this study. 
The second adjustment is on the cost of goods sold (COGS). Moody’s treats COGS as 
patronage income to better reflect how cooperatives distribute residual claims to members. 
Motivation for the adjustment can be observed when accounting for member payments since 
some cooperatives reflect member payments in the COGS line while others place them in the 
statement of cash flows (Moody’s Investors Service, 2010). Table 3.2 illustrates a comparison of 
two cooperatives that account for member payments differently; one does not include a portion 
of member payments explicitly as COGS while the other does. 
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Table 3.2 The Effect of Member Payments in the form of Cost of Goods Sold 
 NO COGS COOP  YES COGS COOP  
($ MILLIONS)  NO CORN COST IN COGS  INCLUDES CORN COST IN COGS  
Sales  100  100  
Cost of goods sold - processing costs  -20  -20  
Cost of goods sold - corn  -  -60  
Gross profit  80  20  
SG&A  -10  -10  
Operating profit  70  10  
Traditional operating margin  70%  10%  
Interest  -4  -4  
Taxes  -1  -1  
Net income  65  5  
Cash patronage payments to farmers  -63  -3  
Earnings retained in COOP  2  2  
Note. Reprinted from “Rating Methodology: Global Agricultural Cooperatives Industry” by Moody’s Investors Service 
(Moody’s Investors Service, 2010). 
Although margins and line item balances are different between the two cooperatives, they 
distribute the same total amount of member payments and are financially equal. The no COGS 
cooperative lists all payments made to members in the Cash patronage payments to farmers line 
while the yes COGS cooperative splits member payments between the Cost of goods sold - corn 
and Cash patronage payments to farmers lines. 
Moody’s procedure for calculating the respective components of the four credit metrics 
are shown in Table 3.3. This research calculates Total Member payments for produce as COGS 
for Commodities + COGS for Processed Goods + COGS for Supplies. Funds from Operations 




Table 3.3 Financial Statement Steps for Calculating Credit Metrics 
Net Sales  
COGS  
TOTAL MEMBER PAYMENTS  
Total member payments for produce  
+ Gross cash payments to retire members equity  
+ Net savings paid in cash  
- Current year cash equity retains  
=Total member payments  
% of member payments Add-back  
Add-back Amount  
CASH FLOW ADJUSTMENTS  
Funds from Operations before Add-back  
+ Add-back Amount  
= COOP Funds from Operations (FFO)  
- Non-member dividends  
- Gross cash payments to retire members equity  
- Net savings paid in cash  
+ Current year cash equity retains  
= COOP Retained Cash Flow (RCF)  
INCOME STATEMENT ADJUSTMENTS  
Member payments included in COGS?  
Earnings Before Interest Taxes and Amortization  
- Member produce payments NOT included in COGS  
+ Add-back Amount  
COOP Earnings Before Interest Taxes and Amortization (EBITA)  
+ Depreciation  
= COOP Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA)  
OTHER FINANCIAL DATA  
Total Debt  
- Cash  
= Net Debt  
Interest Expense  
Capital Expenditures  
Note. Reprinted from “Rating Methodology: Global Agricultural Cooperatives Industry” by 
Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s Investors Service, 2010). 
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 3.1.3 Mapping the Credit Metrics Factor to Rating Categories 
Once the credit metrics have been calculated the next step is to map them to their 
respective sub-factor ratings. Each credit metric has a range that corresponds to seven respective 
sub-factor rating categories (i.e., Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, and Caa) whereby Aaa is the highest 
rating possible and Caa is the lowest. Investment grade ratings consist of Aaa, Aa, A, and Baa. 
Non-investment grade ratings consist of Ba, B, and Caa. Once the sub-factor ratings have been 
determined, the next step is to map them to their respective sub-factor score. Table 3.4 illustrates 
the numerical ranges of the four credit metrics and what sub-factor rating categories they fall 
under. 
Table 3.4 Mapping Credit Metrics to Sub-Factor Ratings 


















≥35% ≥27 - 35% ≥17 - 27% ≥10 - 17% ≥6 - 10% ≥3 - 6% <3% 
Note. Reprinted from “Rating Methodology: Global Agricultural Cooperatives Industry” by Moody’s 
Investors Service (Moody’s Investors Service, 2010). 
Table 3.5 illustrates the mapping of sub-factor ratings to their corresponding sub-factor 
scores. There are 7 categories of sub-factor scores (i.e. 1, 3, 6 , 9, 12, 15, and 18) corresponding 
to a sub-factor rating. Translating them to their numerical equivalent allows for a weighted score 
to be determined that can then be mapped to the overall grid-indicated rating. 
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Table 3.5 Sub-Factor Mapping/Scoring 
Measurement Outcome  Strongest<-------------------------------------------------------> Weakest  
Sub-Factor Rating  Aaa  Aa  A  Baa  Ba  B  Caa  
Sub-Factor Score  1  3  6  9  12  15  18  
Note. Reprinted from “Rating Methodology: Global Agricultural Cooperatives Industry” 
by Moody’s Investors Service(Moody’s Investors Service, 2010). 
 3.1.4 Determining the Overall Grid-Indicated Rating 
The overall rating process assigns equal weights to the credit metrics in determining the 
indicated rating. Similarly, this study assigns equal weights to the four credit metrics. The 
aggregate weighted score is determined by the following formula: 




The resulting aggregate weighted score is then mapped to the indicated rating as shown in 
Table 3.6. Since there are only 19 annual observations for 162 cooperatives, the granularity of 
the 18 rating categories likely results in their respective frequencies being too low. Therefore, the 
numerical modifier is dropped, and seven rating categories are used (i.e. Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, 
Caa). Ratings Aaa1, Aaa2, and Aaa3 are consolidated to Aaa, ratings Aa1, Aa2, Aa3 are 
consolidated to Aa, and so on. The ratings that this study assigns to cooperatives following the 
aforementioned rating methodology are Credit Metric Ratings and explicitly describe the credit 
quality of cooperatives implied by their respective financial positions only. 
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FACTOR SCORE RANGE  
Aaa    x  <  1.5  
Aa1  1.5  ≤  x  <  2.5  
Aa2  2.5  ≤  x  <  3.5  
Aa3  3.5  ≤  x  <  4.5  
A1  4.5  ≤  x  <  5.5  
A2  5.5  ≤  x  <  6.5  
A3  6.5  ≤  x  <  7.5  
Baa1  7.5  ≤  x  <  8.5  
Baa2  8.5  ≤  x  <  9.5  
Baa3  9.5  ≤  x  <  10.5  
Ba1  10.5  ≤  x  <  11.5  
Ba2  11.5  ≤  x  <  12.5  
Ba3  12.5  ≤  x  <  13.5  
B1  13.5  ≤  x  <  14.5  
B2  14.5  ≤  x  <  15.5  
B3  15.5  ≤  x  <  16.5  
Caa1  16.5  ≤  x  <  17.5  
Caa2  17.5  ≤  x      
Note. Reprinted from “Rating Methodology: Global Agricultural Cooperatives Industry” 
by Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s Investors Service, 2010). 
 3.2 Markov Chain Theory 
The theory and derivation of this section follows Resnick (2013, pp. 60–147).  
 3.2.1 Stochastic Processes 
A stochastic process {𝑋𝑛}𝑛∈ℕ0 is a collection of random variables indexed by a 
mathematical set known as the index set, n, and the random variable takes values in a countable 
set 𝑆 known as the state space where 𝑆 =  {1, 2, … , 𝑚}. 
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 3.2.2 The Markov Property 
The Markov Property or First Order Markov Condition assumes that the future value of 
the random variable only depends on its current value, thus past values are irrelevant. This 
property implies that the process is memoryless. 
 3.2.3 The Discrete-Time Markov Chain 
A discrete-time Markov Chain is a stochastic process {𝑋𝑛}𝑛∈ℕ0with a Markov Property 
that takes on values in a countable state space 𝑆 if,  
 ℙ[𝑋𝑛+1 = 𝑖𝑛+1|𝑋𝑛 = 𝑖𝑛 , 𝑋𝑛−1 = 𝑖𝑛−1, … , 𝑋1 = 𝑖1, 𝑋0 = 𝑖0] = ℙ[𝑋𝑛+1 = 𝑖𝑛+1|𝑋𝑛 = 𝑖𝑛], (1.1) 
for all 𝑛  ℕ0, and all 𝑖0, 𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑛, 𝑖𝑛+1 ∈ 𝑆. The process will initiate in one of the states in 𝑆. 
Over an interval of time, the process may move to another state. This single move is known as a 
step. In general, the element in S representing the current state is denoted by 𝑖 and the element 
representing the future state will be denoted by 𝑗. Therefore (3.1) can be rewritten as, 
 ℙ[𝑋𝑛+1 = 𝑗|𝑋𝑛 = 𝑖]. (3.2) 
 3.2.4 Transition Probabilities and Time-Homogenous Markov Chains 
The likelihood of a step from state i to state j is called the transition probability denoted 
as pij. Likewise, the likelihood that the process remains in state i is denoted as 𝑝𝑖𝑖 . When pij is 
independent of time n, that is, 
 ℙ[𝑋𝑛+1 = 𝑗|𝑋𝑛 = 𝑖] = 𝑝𝑖𝑗 , (3.3) 
then the probabilities are time-homogenous or stationary. 
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 3.2.5 Initial Probability Distribution 
There exists a probability distribution when the Markov chain i.e. the system, initiates at 
time n = 0. This distribution is a vector and is known as the Initial Probability Distribution. The 
probability ℙ[𝑋0 = 𝑖] that the system initiates in state 𝑖 is denoted as: 
𝑝𝑖 , 
whereby 
𝑝𝑖 ≥ 0, 





The path that the system takes can be simplified to 
ℙ[𝑋0 = 𝑖0, 𝑋1 = 𝑖1, … , 𝑋𝑛 = 𝑖𝑛] = 𝑝𝑖0𝑝(𝑖0, 𝑖1)𝑝(𝑖1, 𝑖2) … 𝑝(𝑖𝑛−1, 𝑖𝑛) 
as the product of the initial probability distribution and all the elements in the matrix 
representing the path taken. 
 3.2.6 One-Step Transition Matrices 
The collection of transition probabilities corresponding to all possible single step 
transitions between states in 𝑆 is called the one-step transition matrix denoted as, 
 𝐏 = (𝑝𝑖𝑗)𝑖,𝑗∈𝑆, (3.4) 
and represented graphically as, 
 𝐏 = [
𝑝11 𝑝12 ⋯ 𝑝1𝑛
𝑝21 𝑝22 ⋯ 𝑝2𝑛
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮






The m x m transition matrix P must satisfy the probability law 
𝑝𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0, 
for ∀𝑖,𝑗∈ 𝑆 and 




that is, elements of the matrix are non-negative, and each row sums up to 1. 
 3.2.7 Chapman-Kolmogorov Equation 
The time-homogenous property can be extended to calculate the probabilities of 
transitioning from one state to another in multiple steps i.e. n-steps. The n-step transition 
probabilities can be denoted as 
 ℙ[𝑋𝑛+𝑚 = 𝑘|𝑋𝑚 = 𝑖] = ℙ[𝑋𝑛 = 𝑘|𝑋0 = 𝑖], (3.6) 
for 𝑚 ≥ 0, since the probability is independent of time. Therefore, we can simplify the n-step 
transition probability as 
 𝑝𝑖𝑗
(𝑛)
=  ℙ[𝑋𝑛 = 𝑗|𝑋0 = 𝑖], (3.7) 
for 𝑛, 𝑖, 𝑗 ≥ 0. 




0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗,




















for 𝑛, 𝑚 ≥ 0 representing the matrix identity 
 𝑷(𝑛+𝑚) = 𝑷(𝑛) × 𝑷(𝑚). (3.11) 
Assuming ℙ[𝑋0 = 𝑖] =  𝑝𝑖 > 0, the derivation of the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation 
can be computed in the following steps: 
 
ℙ[𝑋𝑛+𝑚 = 𝑗|𝑋0 = 𝑖] 






























The path taken can be expressed as transitioning from state 𝑖 to the intermediate state 𝑘 in n-
steps represented by the probability 𝑝𝑖𝑘
(𝑛)
and then transitioning from state k to state j in m-steps 





 3.2.8 Types of State States 
The possible evolution of a system is limited to the permittable transitions between states 
in the discrete state space S. A state 𝑗 is said to be accessible from state 𝑖 if 
∃ 𝑛 ≥ 0 ∶ 𝑝𝑘𝑗
(𝑛) > 0, 
denoted as 
𝑖 → 𝑗. 
𝑖 → 𝑖 is the result of 𝑛 = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆. If 𝑗 is accessible from 𝑖 and 𝑖 is accessible from j, i.e. 
𝑖 → 𝑗 and 𝑗 → 𝑖, then  𝑖 and 𝑗 communicate, denoted as 
𝑖 ↔ 𝑗. 
Communication is an equivalence relation. The three properties of the relation are: 
i. 𝑖 ↔ 𝑖 for all 𝑖. The relation is reflexive since 𝑖 → 𝑖. 
ii. 𝑖 ↔ 𝑗 implies 𝑗 ↔ 𝑖. The relation is symmetric. 
iii. 𝑖 ↔ 𝑘 and 𝑘 ↔ 𝑗 implies 𝑖 ↔ 𝑗. The relation is transitive. 
We can take the state space 𝑆 and group all states that communicate with each other into a class 
known as an equivalence class. Two equivalence classes are disjoint. To illustrate, say there 
exists a state space S = {A, B, C, D}. It is observed that in S, A communicates with B, and C 
communicates with D. Therefore, two equivalence classes exist, 𝐶1 = {𝐴, 𝐵} and 𝐶2 = {𝐶, 𝐷}. 
Transition probabilities between states within the two equivalence classes are observed to be ½. 
The transition matrix P will be: 
𝐏 = [
1/2 1/2 0 0
1/2 1/2 0 0
0 0 1/2 1/2
0 0 1/2 1/2
]. 
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A Markov Chain is irreducible if the state space S only has one equivalence class i.e. all 
states in S communicate with each other. A state 𝑖 is said to be absorbing if it is impossible to 
transition to another state. A Markov chain is absorbing if it has at least one absorbing state, and 
if it is possible to transition into an absorbing state from any state in n-steps. Non-absorbing 
states are known as transient. A state 𝑖 is recurrent if the probability of the system returning to 𝑖 
is 1 in n-steps, otherwise the state is transient. 
 3.3 Estimating Transition Matrices from the Assigned Credit Metric Ratings 





where 𝑁𝑖 denotes the number of cooperatives with rating 𝑖 in the current period and 𝑁𝑖𝑗 are the 
number of cooperatives that transitioned from rating 𝑖 to rating 𝑗 in the next period.  
 3.4 The Unconditional Migration Matrix 
This study initially estimates one-year migration matrices. Since the dataset spans from 
1996 to 2013, 17 one-year migration matrices are estimated. These matrices serve as the initial 
results of migration behavior on a year to year basis. According to Carty (1997) “an average 
transition matrix is a concise representation not only of the size, but also the direction of typical 
rating changes”. Transition probabilities can be treated as independent multinomial trials if the 
Markov chain is assumed to be time-homogenous thereby permitting the aggregation of all 
annual transition matrices in the sample to obtain the Maximum Likelihood Estimate of a one-
year migration matrix (Anderson & Goodman, 1957; Christensen, Hansen, & Lando, 2004). 
By modifying equation (3.12) to include a time index 𝑡 representing the year, the estimate 






and the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) for the stationary transition probability is 
denoted as 
 ?̂?𝑖𝑗 =







where 𝑇 is the number of years in the sample. MLEs obtained from the entire sample form the 
unconditional migration matrix. The steady state matrix is estimated from the unconditional 
migration matrix. 
 3.5 Assessing Migration Rate Behavior 
Leveraging the approaches highlighted in the Literature Review, this study manipulates 
migration matrices to further assess the migration rate behavior of cooperatives. 
 3.5.1 Increasing the Time Horizon 
Following Altman and Kao (1992b), this study examines the behavior of retention rates 
as the time horizon increases. This is achieved by estimating an average one-year transition 
matrix. Next an average two-year migration matrix is estimated followed by an average three-
year and so on up until the last period of the sample. 
 3.5.2 Migration Rate Volatility 
The downside of taking the average of migration matrices is that it flattens the year-to-
year migration variations caused by exogenous factors such as the state of the economy thereby 
making it beneficial to observe specific migration behavior on a year-to-year basis (L. V. Carty, 
1997). Following Carty (1997), this study tracks the annual fraction of cooperatives downgraded 
from rating 𝑖 to rating 𝑗, the annual fraction of cooperatives upgraded from rating 𝑖 to rating 𝑗, 
and the annual fraction of cooperatives retaining the rating to infer rating volatility. 
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 3.5.3 Rating Drift 
This study calculates rating drift as defined by Carty (1997) to observe the annual change 
in overall cooperative credit quality in the dataset. Given a year, the rating drift is denoted as: 
 
∑ 𝑈𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠 − ∑ 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠
𝑁
 (2.15) 
where 𝑈𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠 is the number of notches a cooperative increases by when they 
upgrade, 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠 is the number of notches a cooperative decreases by when they 
downgrade, and 𝑁 is the number of non-defaulted cooperatives in the current period. A positive 
rating drift indicates an improvement in credit quality while a negative rating drift is a 
deterioration in credit quality. The value of this metric is that it captures both the direction of 
change in credit quality in a given year and its relative magnitude. 
 3.5.4 Rating Activity 
According to Carty (1997), rating activity is the “pace at which ratings change, based on 
units of ratings changed per issuer” and “captures both the effects of multiple rating changes for 
a single issuer within a given year and the relative sizes of rating changes”. Rating activity is 
denoted as: 
 
∑ 𝑈𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠 + ∑ 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠
𝑁
 (3.16) 
where 𝑈𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠 is the number of notches a cooperative increases by when they 
upgrade, 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠 is the number of notches a cooperative decreases by when they 
downgrade, and 𝑁 is the number of non-defaulted cooperatives in the current period. 
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 3.5.5 Rating Change Magnitude 
Another behavioral migration metric that is calculated is the Rating Change Magnitude. It 
captures the number of rating categories that a transition spans (L. V. Carty, 1997). The metric is 
used to count the frequency of the various rating change magnitudes in the dataset. 
 3.5.6 Cooperative Fallen Angel and Rising Star Events 
Fallen angels in this study are defined as cooperatives that are downgraded from 
investment grade to speculative (non-investment) grade. Rising stars are defined as the opposite. 
Two sub-samples corresponding to the event type are created to study their respective historical 
trends. 
 3.5.7 Rating History Dependence 
Before we study time dependence, we examine whether a cooperative’s prior rating 
history has an impact on its subsequent rating direction. We do so by considering whether a 
cooperative was previously upgraded, downgraded or unchanged and then observe the direction 
of the rating transition in the following period. 
 3.6 Addressing Time-Period Sensitivity 
The migration results of this study are likely sensitive to time-periods. Notable periods 
with respect to the cooperative industry are as follows: 
• 1996–2001: A relatively quiet period. Cooperatives experienced some profitability. Not 
much growth was observed but cooperatives are pretty stable from a financial perspective 
in this period. 
• 2002–2004: Financial stress experienced in the industry as a result of the Farmland 
Industries bankruptcy. “Early 2000s Recession” likely contributed to the stress during 
this period. 
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• 2005–2007: A relatively quiet period. Cooperatives experienced some profitability. Not 
much growth was observed but cooperatives are pretty stable from a financial perspective 
in this period. 
• 2008 – 2009: There was a large runup in grain prices. Commodity markets experienced 
extreme volatility due to the “Great Recession” and “Financial Crisis”.  
• 2010 – 2014: Boom times for cooperatives. Cooperatives were very profitable in this 
period. They grew organically and via mergers. Cooperatives assumed more debt. 
This study will estimate conditional migration matrices by creating sub-samples that are 
conditioned on the stage of the business cycle and the performance of the agricultural sector 
using Real Net Farm Income as a proxy. 
 3.6.1 Conditioning on the Business Cycle 
Two sub-samples of the dataset are created to study the effects of the business cycle. The 
sub-samples correspond to expansions and contractions as defined by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER). Expansionary periods consist of years 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 
2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013. Contractionary periods 
consist of years 2001, 2008, and 2009. One-period migration matrices are estimated, followed by 
each sub-sample’s average one-period migration matrix. 
 3.6.2 Conditioning on Real Net Farm Income 
To determine the dependence of migration rates on the state of the economy, Nickell et 
al. (2000) segmented their sample years into three categories—peak, normal times, and trough—
which corresponded to the tertiles (three-quantiles) of real GDP growth. This study will not use 
real GDP growth as it does not best represent the performance of the agricultural sector. Instead, 
real net farm income (RNFI) will be used in its place. Similar to Nickell et al. (2000), sample 
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years, 1996–2013, are allocated into three categories—peak, normal times, and trough—whereby 
peak corresponds to sample years with an RNFI above the 75th percentile, trough will correspond 
to sample years with an RNFI below the 25th percentile, and normal times will correspond to 
sample years with an RNFI between the 25th and 75th percentiles. 
 3.7 Measuring the Accuracy of an Estimated Transition Probability 
There exists a true population of cooperatives with transition probabilities of 𝑝𝑖𝑗. 
However, the true population is unknown and consequently, 𝑝𝑖𝑗is also unknown, therefore the 
standard deviation cannot be determined. The transition probabilities, ?̂?𝑖𝑗, that are calculated in 
this study are estimators of 𝑝𝑖𝑗. Since the transition probabilities ?̂?𝑖𝑗 in a matrix are proportions 
and are assumed to be independent, the properties of the Binomial Distribution can be adopted to 
determine how precise ?̂?𝑖𝑗 is by calculating the estimated sampling variance 
 𝑣𝑎?̂?(?̂?𝑖𝑗) = ?̂?𝑖𝑗(1 − ?̂?𝑖𝑗)/𝑛𝑖 (3) 
and the estimated standard error 
 𝑠?̂?(?̂?𝑖𝑗) = √𝑣𝑎?̂?(?̂?𝑖𝑗) = √?̂?𝑖𝑗(1 − ?̂?𝑖𝑗)/𝑛𝑖 (4) 
where ?̂?𝑖𝑗 is the probability of transitioning from state 𝑖 to 𝑗, and 𝑛𝑖 is the number of cooperatives 
that started in state 𝑖 in the sample. 
While the standard error is useful in measuring an estimated probability’s accuracy, it 
cannot be used to compare the corresponding estimate elements in sub-sample matrices and 
therefore a comparative metric is required. The coefficient of variation (CV) is the ratio of the 
estimated standard error to the estimated transition probability denoted as: 
 𝑠?̂?(?̂?𝑖𝑗) ?̂?𝑖𝑗⁄  (3.19) 
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The coefficient of variation is measure of relative variability and is used to compare the 
estimated probabilities between two or more conditioned samples in this study. The larger the 
coefficient of variation the larger the variation in the estimate. For example, if sub-sample 1 has 
a CV of 5% and sub-sample 2 has a CV of 12%, then sub-sample 2 has more variation, relative 
to its mean. 
 3.8 The Predictive Ability of the Estimated Transition Matrix 
Since the probability estimates can be used to predict future distributions this research 
compares them to observed probabilities from the sample data to determine the accuracy of the 
prediction. A sub-sample is created using 2014 observations that are removed and treated as out-
of-sample observations. Using the sub-sample spanning from 1996 to 2013, an average one-
period migration matrix is estimated. The 2013 observations are used to setup the Initial 
Probability Distribution vector. The Initial Probability Distribution vector is multiplied by the 
one-year average migration matrix to obtain the predicted 2014 distribution of transition 
probabilities. The predicted matrix is compared against the actual 2014 distribution. 
 3.9 Detecting Time-Inhomogeneity 
This study calculates the L2 Norm (Euclidean Distance) to detect time-inhomogeneity. 
The L2 Norm is the average root-mean square differences between two matrices. According to 












where 𝑃𝐴 and 𝑃𝐵 are 𝑆 × 𝑆 matrices, 𝑆 is the number of rating categories, and 𝑖 and 𝑗 are the 
rating states. This study calculates the L2 Norm for every year by comparing the unconditional 
migration matrix with each one-year migration matrix in the sample. If the series of L2 Norms 
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are zero or very small then the assumption of time-homogeneity is confirmed but unfortunately it 
is impossible to determine what is small enough to confirm the assumption (Gunnvald, 2014). 
 3.10 The Statistical Tests 
Following Tan and Yılmaz (2002), this study first tests time-dependence and assumes 
stationarity. Once the order is determined, stationarity is tested. The authors state that there are 
three possible outcomes. The first potential outcome is that the order and stationarity are 
confirmed. The second is that stationarity is rejected after determining the order. According to 
Tan and Yılmaz, the consequence of this outcome is that the order cannot be determined by 
Markov chains using the sample as is. They suggest dividing it into smaller sub-samples, 
repeating the test until stationarity is confirmed. However, there are not enough observations to 
split the sub-samples into even smaller sub-samples with the hope of identifying time-
homogeneity. Therefore, if time-homogeneity is rejected after confirming the order of the 
process, the conclusion of the test will be “time-heterogenous, order inconclusive”. The last 
possibility mentioned by the authors is that the test is “inconclusive” if the order of the chain 
cannot be determined. This is because testing for stationarity is only necessary if the order is 
known. 
 3.10.1 The Time-Dependence Test 
The purpose of the time-dependence test is to confirm the validity of the assumption that 
the process is first-order. According to Tan and Yılmaz (2002), the steps are to test two 
sequential orders at a time. The last order to test is set by the researcher. The test begins with 
testing the zero-order process with the first-order and ending the procedure when the result is do 
not reject. A stochastic process is first-order if one rejects zero-order against first-order and fails 
to reject first-order against second-order. The hypotheses are: 
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𝐻0: ∀𝑖: 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 𝑝𝑗 
𝐻𝐴: ∃𝑖: 𝑝𝑖𝑗 ≠ 𝑝𝑗 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑗is the probability of transitioning from state 𝑖 to 𝑗 estimated from the entire sample, and 
𝑝𝑗 is the probability of a cooperative transitioning to rating 𝑗 estimated from the entire sample. 
The Pearson 𝜒2 Test and the Likelihood Ratio Test are used. 
The Pearson 𝜒2 Test for evaluating the first-order Markov property is denoted as 








~𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦𝝌2((𝑠 − 1)2) (5) 
where 𝑛𝑖 is the total number of cooperatives that transitioned from rating 𝑖 over the entire 
sample, 𝑝𝑖𝑗 is the probability of transitioning from state 𝑖 to 𝑗 estimated from the entire sample, 
𝑝𝑗 is the probability of transitioning to state 𝑗 estimated from the entire sample and is assumed 
that 𝑝𝑗 > 0. 𝑄
(𝑂(0)) has a chi-squared distribution with (𝑠 − 1)2 degrees of freedom. 
The Likelihood Ratio Test for evaluating the first-order Markov property is denoted as 








~𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦𝝌2((𝑠 − 1)2) (6) 
where 𝑛𝑖𝑗 is the total number of cooperatives that transitioned from rating 𝑖 to 𝑗 over the entire 
sample, 𝑝𝑖𝑗is the probability of transitioning from state 𝑖 to 𝑗 estimated from the entire sample, 𝑝𝑖 
is the probability of transitioning from state 𝑖 estimated from the entire sample, and 𝑝𝑖 > 0. 
𝐿𝑅(𝑂(0)) has a 𝝌2 distribution with (𝑠 − 1)2 degrees of freedom. 
The second-order Markov chain considers a cooperative transitioning to state 𝑗 in time 
𝑡 + 1 given it was in state ℎ in time 𝑡 − 1 and state 𝑖 in time 𝑡. Since the matrix is two 
dimensional, the transition to state 𝑖 from ℎ is thought of as a composite state (Anderson & 
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Goodman, 1957; Basawa & Rao, 1980) and will represent the initial state in the matrix. The 
hypotheses to test the second-order Markov chain are: 
𝐻0: ∀ℎ: 𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑗 = 𝑝𝑖𝑗 
𝐻𝐴: ∃ℎ: 𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑗 ≠ 𝑝𝑖𝑗 
The Pearson 𝜒2 Test for evaluating the second-order Markov property is denoted as 










~𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦𝝌2(𝑠(𝑠 − 1)2) (3.23) 
where 𝑛ℎ𝑖 is a composite state that represents the total number of cooperatives that transitioned 
from rating ℎ in time 𝑡 − 1 to rating 𝑖 in 𝑡 over the entire sample, 𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑗is the probability of a 
cooperative transitioning to state 𝑗 in 𝑡 + 1 given it was in state ℎ in time 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑖 in 𝑡 
estimated from the entire sample, 𝑝𝑖𝑗is the probability of transitioning from state 𝑖 in time 𝑡 to 𝑗 
in 𝑡 + 1 estimated from the entire sample. 𝑄(𝑂(1)) has a 𝝌2 distribution with 𝑠(𝑠 − 1)2 degrees 
of freedom. 
The Likelihood Ratio Test for evaluating the second-order Markov property is denoted as 









~𝑎𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦𝝌2(𝑠(𝑠 − 1)2) (3.24) 
where 𝐶ℎ𝑖 = {𝑗: ?̂?ℎ𝑖𝑗 > 0} is the set of non-zero transition probabilities in the ℎ𝑖-th row of the 
average transition matrix estimated from the entire sample, 𝐶𝑖 = {𝑗: ?̂?𝑖𝑗 > 0} is the set of non-
zero transition probabilities in the 𝑖-th row of the average transition matrix estimated from the 
entire sample, 𝑛ℎ𝑖𝑗 represents the total number of cooperatives that transitioned to 𝑗 given they 
were in rating ℎ in time 𝑡 − 1 and rating 𝑖 in 𝑡 over the entire sample—again ℎ𝑖 is a composite 
state, 𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑗is the probability of a cooperative transitioning to state 𝑗 in 𝑡 + 1 given it was in state ℎ 
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in time 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑖 in 𝑡 estimated from the entire sample, and 𝑝𝑖𝑗 is the probability of 
transitioning from state 𝑖 to 𝑗 estimated from the entire sample, 𝑐𝑖 is the number of elements in 
𝐶𝑖, 𝐷𝑖 = {ℎ: 𝑛ℎ𝑖 > 0} is the set of non-zero transition frequencies from composite state ℎ𝑖 in the 
𝑖-th row of the average transition matrix estimated from the sample, and 𝑑𝑖 is the number of 
elements in 𝐷𝑖. 𝐿𝑅
(𝑂(1)) has a 𝝌2 distribution with 𝑠(𝑠 − 1)2 degrees of freedom. 
 3.10.2 The Test for Time-Homogeneity 
Following Bickenbach and Bode (2003), the sample comprising of 𝑇 transitions will be 
divided into 𝑀 mutually exclusive and exhaustive sub-samples (𝑚 = 1, 2, … , 𝑀; 𝑀 ≤ 𝑇) and the 
average migration matrices from each sub-sample is compared against the sample’s 
unconditional migration matrix to determine if the difference is significant. The hypotheses as 
proposed by Anderson and Goodman (1957) are: 
𝐻0: ∀𝑚: 𝑝𝑖𝑗|𝑚 = 𝑝𝑖𝑗 
𝐻𝐴: ∃𝑚: 𝑝𝑖𝑗|𝑚 ≠ 𝑝𝑖𝑗 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑗|𝑚 is the probability of transitioning from state 𝑖 to 𝑗 that is estimated from the entire 
sub-sample 𝑚, and 𝑝𝑖𝑗is the probability of transitioning from state 𝑖 to 𝑗 that is estimated from 
the entire sample. The Pearson 𝜒2 and the Likelihood Ratio Tests will be used. 
The Pearson 𝜒2 Test for evaluating stationarity is denoted as: 












𝑎𝑖 − 1)(𝑏𝑖 − 1)) (3.25) 
where 𝐴𝑖 = {𝑗: ?̂?𝑖𝑗 > 0} is the set of non-zero transition probabilities in the 𝑖-th row of the 
average transition matrix estimated from the sample, 𝑛𝑖|𝑚 is the total number of cooperatives that 
transitioned from rating 𝑖 over the entire time period in the 𝑚-th sub-sample, ?̂?𝑖𝑗|𝑚 is the 
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probability of transitioning from state 𝑖 to 𝑗 that is estimated from the entire time period of the 
𝑚-th sub-sample, ?̂?𝑖𝑗 is the probability of transitioning from state 𝑖 to 𝑗 that is estimated from the 
entire sample, 𝑎𝑖 is the number of elements in 𝐴𝑖, and 𝑏𝑖 is the number of sub-samples that have 
at least one cooperative in the 𝑖-th row i.e. 𝐵𝑖 = {𝑚: 𝑛𝑖|𝑚 > 0}. 𝑄
(𝑀)has a 𝝌2 distribution with 
(𝑎𝑖 − 1)(𝑏𝑖 − 1) degrees of freedom. 
The Likelihood Ratio Test for evaluating stationarity is denoted as  











𝑎𝑖 − 1)(𝑏𝑖 − 1)) (7) 
where 𝐴𝑖|𝑚 = {𝑗: ?̂?𝑖𝑗|𝑚 > 0} is the set of non-zero transition probabilities in the 𝑖-th row of the 
average transition matrix estimated from the 𝑚-th sub-sample, 𝑛𝑖𝑗|𝑚 is the total number of 
cooperatives that transitioned from rating 𝑖 to 𝑗 over the entire time period in the 𝑚-th sub-
sample, ?̂?𝑖𝑗|𝑚 is the probability of transitioning from state 𝑖 to 𝑗 estimated from the entire time 
period of the 𝑚-th sub-sample, ?̂?𝑖𝑗 is the probability of transitioning from state 𝑖 to 𝑗 estimated 
from the entire sample, 𝑎𝑖 is the number of elements in 𝐴𝑖, and 𝑏𝑖 is the number of sub-samples 
that have at least one cooperative in the 𝑖-th row i.e. 𝐵𝑖 = {𝑚: 𝑛𝑖|𝑚 > 0}. 𝐿𝑅
(𝑚) has a 𝝌2 
distribution with (𝑎𝑖 − 1)(𝑏𝑖 − 1) degrees of freedom. 
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Chapter 4 - Data 
 4.1 Data Description 
This study used proprietary, fiscal year-end financial statement data from agricultural 
cooperatives provided by CoBank. The cooperatives in the sample have loans with CoBank. The 
sample data was restricted from 1996 to 2013, and 2014 observations were used for out-of-
sample forecast evaluation. To confirm the accuracy of the financial statements, a reconciliation 
of the income statement and balance sheet was conducted. 
This study does not assume why a cooperative ceases to be included in the dataset. Any 
instances of cooperatives that were not observed annually throughout the dataset were removed. 
Instances of cooperatives changing their reporting dates and SIC Group Description (Farm 
Supply/Marketing and Grain Marketing) were removed. Initially the sample consisted of 162 
agricultural cooperatives. The previous steps resulted in the elimination of 7 cooperatives from 
the panel dataset. The final dataset consisted of 155 cooperatives to study; equivalently this 
translated to 2,790 firm years. In the final set, 133 cooperatives were Farm Supply/Marketing 
while 22 were Grain Marketing, according to the SIC Group Description. 
Net Farm Income (NFI) was obtained from the United States Department of Agriculture 
Economic Research Service (ERS), updated as of March 6th, 2019. Only annual observations of 
NFI from 1996 to 2014 were used. Annual observations of the average Effective Federal Funds 
Rate corresponding to the sample years were obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis. 
 4.2 Summary Statistics 
Most cooperatives in the CoBank data are relatively small. Of the 2,790 firm years in the 
19962013 sample, 1,375 (49.28%) had less than $25 million in sales, 576 (20.65%) had $25 to 
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$50 million in sales, and 839 (30.07%) had sales of more than $50 million. Compared to smaller 
firms, larger entities tend to be less adversely affected to normal business challenges or 
recessions (Psillaki, Tsolas, & Margaritis, 2010).  
All 18 rating categories with the numerical modifiers were classified in the dataset. The 
distribution of the ratings was right skewed (Figure 4.1). Most cooperatives in the sample were 
investment grade (i.e. Aaa–Baa3). The granularity of the 18-class rating scale was able to capture 
the smaller differences in rating quality. There were more Aa1 rated cooperatives than there were 
Aaa, Aa2, and Aa3. The average rating of a cooperative using the 18-class rating scale was Baa1. 
Figure 4.1 Distribution of Credit Metric Ratings with Numeric Modifier 
 
Seven rating classes remained after eliminating the numeric modifiers (Figure 4.2). Again, 
the distribution was right skewed. There were far fewer Aaa rated cooperatives than Aa, A, and 
Baa. Cooperatives rated A had the highest frequency in the sample followed by Aa then Baa. Only 



































Figure 4.2 Distribution of Credit Metric Ratings without Numeric Modifier 
 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the distribution of the locations of the cooperatives. Illinois and 
Kansas each had 26 cooperatives, the highest in the sample, followed by Iowa with 23. The 
lowest frequency observed was 1 cooperative in California, Florida, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, 
South Dakota, and Virginia. 


































Figure 4.4 illustrates the annual frequency of ratings and RNFI. Annual frequencies of 
Aaa and Caa rated cooperatives are low relative to other ratings. Cooperatives rated Aa declined 
in frequency to 2008 with some variation, increased from 13 in 2008 to 55 in 2009, decreased in 
2011, and increased thereafter. Non-investment grade cooperatives increased in frequency from 
1997 to 2003, declined in 2004 and 2005, and decreased from 2006 to 2008. Figure 4.4 also 
indicates that there is no clear relationship between the ratings and RNFI. 
Figure 4.4 Annual Frequency of Ratings and Real Net Farm Income, 1996–2013 
 
 Figure 4.5 illustrates the average balance sheet over time. The average total assets across 
the sample was $23.95 million, average total liabilities was $14.41 million, and the average total 
equity was $9.54 million. The balance sheet increased over time. The spikes in average total 
liabilities were a result of increased commodity market volatility. The amount of seasonal loans 
increased to meet margin calls in addition to increased capital investment thereby driving long-
term debt. Average total equity did not experience any variation and trended upwards throughout 
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Figure 4.5 The Average Balance Sheet Over Time 
 
 Average interest expense relative to average total debt as shown in Figure 4.6 was at its 
highest in 1996. Interest expense trended downwards thereafter and increased in 2000. It trended 
downwards again the following year until 2005. It sharply increased again 2006 and increased 
further in 2007. 2008 to 2010 saw a decreasing trend in interest expense and it levelled off 
thereafter. 
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To assess the representativeness of the data used in this study, average financial metrics 
from the CoBank data were compared to agricultural cooperative data from the USDA (Table 
4.1). The similarity of the two sets of metrics indicated that the CoBank data is representative of 
the national sample. “The representativeness of the CoBank data is unsurprising as CoBank has a 
national charter to lend to agricultural cooperatives, as well as strong market share in the 
cooperative sector” (Smart, Briggeman, Tack, & Perry, 2019). 
Table 4.1 Comparison of Average 2014 CoBank and United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) Agricultural Cooperative Financial Data 
Variable CoBank Data USDA Data 
Total Assets $43,858,266 $41,349,953 
Total Liabilities $21,434,810 $23,498,101 
Total Equity $22,423,456 $17,851,852 
Total Sales $116,982,551 $114,128,443 
Cost of Goods Sold $108,864,314 $104,573,837 
Gross Margin $8,118,237 $9,554,558 
Total Expenses $5,502,886 $6,484,378 
Net Income $2,615,351 $3,070,180 
Number of Cooperatives 155 2,106 
Sources: CoBank Risk Analyst Database and USDA Cooperative Data 
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Chapter 5 - Results 
 5.1 Unconditional Migration Matrix Analysis 
The unconditional migration matrix was calculated by first constructing the total count of 
every one-year transition in the 1996–2013 sample. The probabilities were then estimated by 
dividing each element by their respective row sums. The estimates from the unconditional 
sample are expected to be the best Maximum Likelihood estimators of the possible rating 
transitions. 
 5.1.1 The One-Year Average Migration Matrix 
A migration matrix represents the change in credit rating of a cooperative from its 
original rating in the current period to the terminal rating in the next period. Each row of the 
matrix represents the original rating and each column represents the terminal rating. Table 5.1 
reports the count of transitions between ratings over the entire 1996–2013 sample. The sum of 
the elements in a given row, 𝑖, indicate the total number of cooperatives that are rated 𝑖 in the 
current period. The sum of the elements in a given column, 𝑗, indicate the total number of 
cooperatives that transitioned to rating 𝑗 in the next period. Most migrations occurred among 
investment grade ratings i.e. Aaa, Aa, Aa, and Baa. The highest transition frequency in the 
sample was the retention of the Aa rating (296), followed by retaining the A rating (283). As the 
original rating decreased in credit quality, the frequency of being downgraded to Caa increased. 
The frequency of retaining the Aaa rating is lower than being downgraded to Aa since the 
expectation is to observe the largest frequencies along the diagonal. There was one more upgrade 
event than retention events for Ba rated cooperatives, and cooperatives rated Caa experienced 
more upgrade events than retention events. 
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Table 5.1 Unconditional One-Year Total Count Migration Matrix, 1996–2013 
 Terminal Rating 
Original Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 39 43 24 6 1 0 0 
Aa 45 296 138 73 33 10 0 
A 16 160 283 158 53 12 3 
Baa 9 70 167 181 110 40 7 
Ba 0 31 58 110 109 65 14 
B 0 15 27 36 53 60 21 
Caa 0 1 2 6 14 21 15 
 
The probabilities of transitioning from rating 𝑖 to rating 𝑗 are obtained by taking each 
transition frequency from Table 5.1 and dividing it by its corresponding row sum. Table 5.2 
illustrates the unconditional one-year average transition probabilities estimated over the entire 
1996–2013 sample. Stability refers to the likelihood of a cooperative maintaining its rating in the 
next period. Volatility increases as stability decreases. Aa (49.75%) and A (41.31%) rated 
cooperatives were more stable than those rated Aaa (34.51%) over a one-year time horizon since 
cooperatives rated Aa and A had higher probabilities than cooperatives rated Aa. Increasing 
volatility as credit quality decreases is not strictly observed across all seven rating classes. 
Volatility strictly increases from Aa to Ba only, while B (28.30%) rated cooperatives are slightly 
more stable than Ba (28.17%), and those rated Caa (25.42%) are the most volatile as expected. 
Monotonicity is observed in the estimates since the probability of migrating to another class 
decreases the further away it is. 
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Table 5.2 Unconditional One-Year Average Migration Matrix, 1996–2013 
 Terminal Rating 
Original Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 34.51% 38.05% 21.24% 5.31% 0.88% 0.00% 0.00% 
 (4.47%) (4.57%) (3.85%) (2.11%) (0.88%) (0.00%) (0.00%) 
Aa 7.56% 49.75% 23.19% 12.27% 5.55% 1.68% 0.00% 
 (1.08%) (2.05%) (1.73%) (1.34%) (0.94%) (0.53%) (0.00%) 
A 2.34% 23.36% 41.31% 23.07% 7.74% 1.75% 0.44% 
 (0.58%) (1.62%) (1.88%) (1.61%) (1.02%) (0.50%) (0.25%) 
Baa 1.54% 11.99% 28.60% 30.99% 18.84% 6.85% 1.20% 
 (0.51%) (1.34%) (1.87%) (1.91%) (1.62%) (1.05%) (0.45%) 
Ba 0.00% 8.01% 14.99% 28.42% 28.17% 16.80% 3.62% 
 (0.00%) (1.38%) (1.81%) (2.29%) (2.29%) (1.90%) (0.95%) 
B 0.00% 7.08% 12.74% 16.98% 25.00% 28.30% 9.91% 
 (0.00%) (1.76%) (2.29%) (2.58%) (2.97%) (3.09%) (2.05%) 
Caa 0.00% 1.69% 3.39% 10.17% 23.73% 35.59% 25.42% 
 (0.00%) (1.68%) (2.36%) (3.93%) (5.54%) (6.23%) (5.67%) 
 
The standard error indicates the reliability of the estimate in representing the transition 
probability of the population (Table 5.2). The standard errors of the estimates indicated that the 
probabilities of retaining Aa (2.05%), A (1.88%), Baa (1.91%), and Ba (2.29%) ratings were 
more reliable than the estimates of retaining Aaa (4.47%), B (3.09%), and Caa (5.67%) ratings 
since they were relatively smaller. Not including Aaa, the small standard errors were a result of 
the high frequency of observations retaining an investment grade and the Ba rating since a larger 
sample size decreases standard error. 
There were numerous instances of cooperatives making transitions of three or more rating 
classes. A change in credit rating indicates a degree of instability so it follows that large rating 
changes correspond to large instabilities. Most cooperatives in the sample are relatively small in 
size. There are two important implications of a cooperative being small. Firstly, smaller 
cooperatives are unlikely to be as diversified as larger cooperatives. Cooperatives that are not 
adequately diversified are unable to eliminate unsystematic risk. The scale also suggests that they 
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are less likely to be geographically diversified. This means localized events such as drought or 
adverse weather events can severely impair a cooperative’s revenues. The characteristics of the 
cooperatives that experienced large rating changes are investigated. Table 5.3 shows the 
frequencies and proportions of cooperatives that changed by three or more ratings. Most 
cooperatives that changed by three or more ratings had sales of less than $25 million (61.11%), 
representing 28.39% of cooperatives in the 1996–2013 sample. The large rating changes 
observed indicate how sensitive some cooperatives were to the risks they were exposed to in 
their respective operations. 
Table 5.3 Cooperatives Changing by 3 Ratings or More 
Sales Size Frequency Proportion % of Cooperatives 
<$25M 44 61.11% 28.39% 
$25M-$50M 13 18.06% 8.39% 
$50M+ 15 20.83% 9.68% 
 
 5.1.2 The Steady State 
Assuming the Markov property and stationarity assumptions hold, cooperatives are more 
likely to transition to a prime rating in the long-run. The transition probabilities in Table 5.4 
indicate the limiting values of possible transitions as time approaches infinity. Cooperatives are 
more likely to transition to rating A (27.00%). The second most likely transition is rating Aa 
(24.00%) followed by rating Baa (21.00%). Downgrading or maintaining the Caa (2.00%) rating 
was the least likely transition state in the 1996–2013 sample. 
  
59 
Table 5.4 The Steady State of Agricultural Cooperatives, 1996–2013 
 Terminal Rating 
Original Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 4.00% 24.00% 27.00% 21.00% 14.00% 8.00% 2.00% 
Aa 4.00% 24.00% 27.00% 21.00% 14.00% 8.00% 2.00% 
A 4.00% 24.00% 27.00% 21.00% 14.00% 8.00% 2.00% 
Baa 4.00% 24.00% 27.00% 21.00% 14.00% 8.00% 2.00% 
Ba 4.00% 24.00% 27.00% 21.00% 14.00% 8.00% 2.00% 
B 4.00% 24.00% 27.00% 21.00% 14.00% 8.00% 2.00% 
Caa 4.00% 24.00% 27.00% 21.00% 14.00% 8.00% 2.00% 
 
 5.1.3 Multi-Year, Average Rating Transition Matrices 
Average migration matrices were calculated for each time horizon using the 1996–2013 
sample. Table 5.5 shows the retention rates for the first five time horizons. Migration matrices 
for the first five time horizons can be found in Table A.2 of the appendix. Cooperatives mostly 
experienced a trend of declining retention rates as the time horizon increased for the first five 
years. The probabilities of remaining unchanged in the next period did not decrease strictly with 
decreasing credit rating across all time horizons. Aaa rated cooperatives were more volatile than 
those rated Aa and A across all time horizons. That is, Aa and A rated cooperatives were the 
most stable as the time horizon increased. Baa rated cooperatives were more stable than those 
rated Aaa from the two-year to five-year horizon. Caa rated cooperatives showed a pattern of 
being more likely to be upgraded with increasing time horizon. 
Table 5.5 Retention Rate Behavior with Increasing Time Horizon 
Time Horizon Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
1 34.51% 49.75% 41.31% 30.99% 28.17% 28.30% 25.42% 
2 26.79% 40.77% 36.99% 28.52% 21.18% 25.98% 18.64% 
3 23.42% 38.79% 33.50% 29.72% 20.87% 29.84% 21.05% 
4 18.27% 38.29% 33.21% 26.50% 23.94% 23.76% 16.36% 
5 23.60% 36.32% 31.41% 29.16% 25.16% 24.14% 12.00% 
 
60 
Figure 5.1 shows the annual proportions of rating changes with increasing time horizon 
across the entire 1996-2013 sample. As the time horizon increased, the proportion of 
cooperatives downgraded increased up to the seventh year. The seventh and eighth year showed 
a decrease in the downgrade proportion, but the proportion continued to increase thereafter and 
subsequently fell again in the 12th year. Retention rates rose again but to a lower proportion and 
tapered downwards after. Retention rates generally decreased for the first 12 years but widened 
after and maintained stability. The decrease in retention rates observed for the first 12 years are 
in line with expectations. As the time horizon increases, volatility likely increases and the 
likelihood of retaining the original rating decreases. 
Figure 5.1 Proportions of Rating Changes for 1 Through 17-Year Time Horizons 
 
 5.1.4 Rating Change Magnitude 
Upgrades occurred more frequently than downgrades in the 1996–2013 sample; 31.92% 
of cooperatives upgraded and 30.78% downgraded. Rating change magnitude was calculated to 
assess the frequencies of the size of the migrations. The magnitude is the number of rating 
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were more likely to experience a change of one notch. Of the cooperatives in the sample, 37.31% 
of cooperatives did not experience a rating change while 41.40% changed by one notch (Figure 
5.2 %). For a magnitude of one and greater, the likelihood of a smaller magnitude is higher than 
a larger change with 15.10% of cooperatives changing by two notches and 4.97% changing by 
three. 
Figure 5.2 Frequency of Credit Metric Rating Changes of Various Magnitudes, 1996–2013 
 
 5.1.5 Migration Rate Volatility 
To correct the smoothing effect of averaging transition probabilities, year-to-year rating 
volatility was measured. Cooperatives were more likely to be downgraded than upgraded for 
most of the sample period (Figure 5.3). The average proportion of cooperatives downgraded 
across the sample was 38.86% and the average proportion of cooperatives upgraded was 33.32%. 
The upgrade rate was the largest in 2009 and the downgrade rate was the lowest in the same 
year. The largest change in the upgrade rate occurred from 2008 to 2009 where 70.32% of 
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downgrade rates and surpassed upgrade rates in 2005. The annual proportion of cooperatives 
downgraded increased again from 2009 to 2011 reaching 45.81% and fell to 13.55% in 2012. 
Figure 5.3 Yearly Fraction of Upgraded and Downgraded Cooperatives 
 
 5.1.6 Trends in Credit Quality From 1996 to 2013 
Although a simple comparison between the frequency of upgrades and downgrades on an 
annual basis is insightful in measuring general volatility, a more descriptive measurement can be 
taken by considering the magnitude of the rating change. Average notch-weighted upgrades and 
downgrades reflect the relative frequency of the rating change and also describe their relative 
size in notches. Figure 5.4 illustrates the annual experience of average notch-weighted upgrades 
and downgrades along with RNFI. The average notch size of a rating change across the sample 
0.46. The size of average notch-weighted upgrades was 0.47 across the sample and 0.45 for 
average notch-weighted downgrades. The relationship between average notch-weighted changes 
in ratings and the RNFI was examined by calculating the correlation coefficient. The correlation 
of -0.00698 indicated that average upgraded notches did not have a relationship with RNFI. The 
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average notch-weighted changes had stronger relationships with the Effective Federal Funds 
Rate (EFFR). The average notch-weighted upgrades and average notch-weighted downgrades 
had correlation values of -0.394 and 0.262 respectively. 
Figure 5.4 Historical Trends of Notch-Weighted Upgrades and Downgrades 
 
Figure 5.5 illustrates the annual changes in rating drift and rating activity along with 
historical RNFI. Rating drift is negative when average notch-weighted downgrades exceed 
average notch-weighted upgrades and reflect a decrease in credit quality. Most sample years 
experienced negative rating drift since periods where notch-weighted upgrades exceeding 
equivalently weighted downgrades were short-lived. Credit quality deteriorated by more than 
half a notch from 2003 to 2004 and deteriorated from 2004 to 2007, falling by 0.84 notches. 
There was a rapid improvement from 2007 to 2009 as cooperatives increased their ratings by 
1.62 notches on average during that period. Credit quality collapsed by 1.83 notches from 2009 
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Figure 5.5 Historical Trends of Rating Drift and Rating Activity 
 
Rating drift had little relationship with RNFI with a correlation of 0.0420 and a 
correlation of -0.375 with the Effective Federal Funds Rate. A strong positive relationship was 
observed between rating drift and rating activity as the correlation coefficient was 0.610. The 
difference between calculating rating drift and rating activity is that rating drift takes the 
difference of average notch upgrades and average notch downgrades whereas rating volatility 
aggregates the two. Rating drift and rating activity were possibly being influenced by average 
notch-weighted upgrades. The correlation between rating drift and average notch-weighted 
upgrades was 0.955 indicating a very strong positive relationship. The correlation between rating 
activity and the average notch-weighted upgrades was 0.816. Excluding 2009, rating activity 
across the sample period was relatively stable with small increases and decreases in average 
notch changes. It was evident that the 2009 spike in rating activity was primarily driven by 
increased average notch-weighted upgrades since it coincided with the sharp increase in rating 
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 5.1.7 Cooperative Fallen Angel and Rising Star Events 
Figure 5.6 illustrates the historical rates of fallen angels, rising stars and the Effective 
Federal Funds Rate. Fallen angel events are instances when cooperatives are downgraded from 
investment grade to non-investment grade while rising stars are cooperatives that have been 
upgraded from non-investment grade to investment grade. The average fallen angel rate across 
the sample was 10.21% and the average rising star rate was 10.85%. Rising star rates moved in 
opposite directions to the Effective Federal Funds Rate in most periods. The correlation 
coefficient between the two was -0.425, a moderate negative relationship between rising star 
rates and Effective Federal Funds Rate. Fallen angel rates showed a weak positive relationship 
with Effective Federal Funds Rate with a correlation of 0.256. Rising star rates were more 
subdued than fallen angel rates from 1997 to 2003. A sharp uptick in rising star events occurred 
in 2004 and an even larger rise occurred in 2009. Rising star rates rose from 6.45% in 2007 to 
34.19% in 2009. 
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 5.2 Conditional Migration Matrix Analysis 
This section investigates the potential dependencies that impact credit migration. The 
initial rating of the cooperative along with how it arrived at that rating was studied to offer 
insight on the likelihood of subsequent rating changes. The products and services offered by a 
cooperative are not homogeneous, and their functions may have an effect on rating stability. 
Therefore, the sample was conditioned on two cooperative types, grain marketing and farm 
supply/marketing. Time related conditions are examined since the performance of a cooperative 
most likely varies across different stages of the business cycle (Bangia et al., 2002; Nickell et al., 
2000). The performance of the agricultural sector was also examined using Real Net Farm 
Income as a proxy as it is a measure of farm business profitability. Real Net Farm Income 
fluctuated and there were notable periods that had both favorable and unfavorable impacts on the 
performance of cooperatives. 
 5.2.1 Considering Prior Migration Experiences 
First-order migration matrices do not consider experiences prior the current state. It is 
possible, however, that how a cooperative arrived at its current rating may have a bearing on its 
subsequent rating. That is, subsequent rating changes may be dependent on ratings history and 
not just time. The three types of ratings changes—upgraded, unchanged, and downgraded—were 
considered as the potential paths a cooperative could take in the previous one-year period prior to 
its change in the next period. Table 5.6 presents the migration behavior of cooperatives when the 
prior one-year period experience is considered with the standard errors in parentheses. 
Cooperatives that were previously unchanged were more likely to retain their rating (44.53%), 
while those previously upgraded were more likely to be downgraded (45.45%), and those 
previously downgraded had a higher likelihood of being upgraded (55.92%). The standard errors 
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indicate the estimates of the upgraded to downgraded transition (1.78%) were the most variable 
followed by downgraded to downgraded transition (1.77%). The upgraded to upgraded transition 
(1.31%) had the smallest standard error. These results indicate that the prior rating experience 
impacts the direction of the path a cooperative follows. 
Table 5.6 Subsequent Rating Changes Given Prior Experience 
 Subsequent Behavior 
Prior Experience Upgraded Unchanged Downgraded 
Upgraded 15.88% 38.67% 45.45% 
 (1.31%) (1.74%) (1.78%) 
Unchanged 22.65% 44.53% 32.82% 
 (1.38%) (1.64%) (1.55%) 
Downgraded 55.92% 27.26% 16.82% 
 (1.77%) (1.59%) (1.33%) 
 
 5.2.2 The Type of Cooperative 
The dependence of the type of cooperative was studied by splitting the 1996–2013 
sample into two sub-samples. One sub-sample was comprised of grain marketing cooperatives 
and the other sub-sample consisted of farm supply and marketing cooperatives. Two average 
migration matrices were then calculated (Table 5.7). All retention rates, except Aa and A, for 
farm supply and marketing cooperatives were higher than for grain marketing suggesting that 
they were more stable. In both types of cooperatives, retention rates did not strictly decline with 
decreasing credit quality. Farm supply and marketing cooperatives rated A were more likely to 
be downgraded (35.33%) than grain marketing cooperatives (19.61%). Farm supply and 
marketing cooperatives rated A were more likely to be downgraded than upgraded (24.01%) and 
grain marketing cooperatives rated A were more likely to be to be upgraded (35.29%) than 
downgraded. Investment rated grain marketing cooperatives were never downgraded to Caa, and 
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Aaa rated farm supply and marketing cooperatives were more stable (39.02%) than Aaa rated 
grain cooperatives (22.58%). 
Table 5.7 Cooperative Type Conditional Matrices 
Grain Marketing Cooperatives 
Terminal Rating 
Original Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 22.58% 38.71% 32.26% 6.45% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Aa 10.96% 52.05% 19.18% 10.27% 6.85% 0.68% 0.00% 
A 4.90% 30.39% 45.10% 13.73% 4.90% 0.98% 0.00% 
Baa 5.45% 25.45% 32.73% 21.82% 10.91% 3.64% 0.00% 
Ba 0.00% 28.57% 7.14% 25.00% 21.43% 17.86% 0.00% 
B 0.00% 36.36% 18.18% 18.18% 9.09% 9.09% 9.09% 
Caa 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
Farm Supply and Marketing Cooperatives 
Terminal Rating 
Original Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 39.02% 37.80% 17.07% 4.88% 1.22% 0.00% 0.00% 
Aa 6.46% 49.00% 24.50% 12.92% 5.12% 2.00% 0.00% 
A 1.89% 22.13% 40.65% 24.70% 8.23% 1.89% 0.51% 
Baa 1.13% 10.59% 28.17% 31.95% 19.66% 7.18% 1.32% 
Ba 0.00% 6.41% 15.60% 28.69% 28.69% 16.71% 3.90% 
B 0.00% 5.47% 12.44% 16.92% 25.87% 29.35% 9.95% 
Caa 0.00% 1.72% 3.45% 10.34% 24.14% 34.48% 25.86% 
 
 5.2.3 The Business Cycle 
To assess the impact of the state of the economy on the rating migration rates of 
cooperatives, the 1996–2013 sample was split into two sub-samples corresponding to 
observations that occurred during expansionary periods and those that occurred in recessionary 
periods as defined by the NBER. Two average migration matrices were then calculated (Table 
5.8). During recessionary periods, retention rates for cooperatives rated A down through to B 
were more volatile. The difference in volatility was largest for B rated cooperatives (15.64%) 
followed by Ba rated cooperatives (11.87%). Cooperatives rated Aaa and Aa are similarly stable 
in both expansionary and recessionary periods. Aaa rated cooperatives were more likely to be 
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downgraded below A during expansions (7.21%). Caa rated cooperatives had similar retention 
rates but more importantly indicated that they were more likely to transition to higher rating 
classes in both states of the economy. Overall, the probability of being downgraded was higher 
during expansions than in recessions for all ratings except Aaa. This was unusual since the 
expectation was for cooperatives to be consistently more likely to be downgraded during 
recessions across all rating classes. 
Table 5.8 Business Cycle Conditional Transition Matrices 
Expansions 
Terminal Rating 
Original Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 34.78% 38.04% 19.57% 6.52% 1.09% 0.00% 0.00% 
Aa 6.84% 49.70% 23.54% 12.27% 5.84% 1.81% 0.00% 
A 2.23% 21.48% 42.27% 23.88% 7.90% 1.72% 0.52% 
Baa 0.42% 10.21% 29.79% 31.04% 19.79% 7.71% 1.04% 
Ba 0.00% 4.23% 14.33% 29.32% 30.62% 17.92% 3.58% 
B 0.00% 4.17% 8.93% 19.64% 25.00% 31.55% 10.71% 
Caa 0.00% 0.00% 2.27% 11.36% 22.73% 38.64% 25.00% 
Recessions 
Terminal Rating 
Original Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 33.33% 38.10% 28.57% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Aa 11.22% 50.00% 21.43% 12.24% 4.08% 1.02% 0.00% 
A 2.91% 33.98% 35.92% 18.45% 6.80% 1.94% 0.00% 
Baa 6.73% 20.19% 23.08% 30.77% 14.42% 2.88% 1.92% 
Ba 0.00% 22.50% 17.50% 25.00% 18.75% 12.50% 3.75% 
B 0.00% 18.18% 27.27% 6.82% 25.00% 15.91% 6.82% 
Caa 0.00% 6.67% 6.67% 6.67% 26.67% 26.67% 26.67% 
 
 5.2.4 The Agricultural Sector 
In addition to assessing migration behavior during expansionary and recessionary 
periods, the dependence of migration rates on the performance of the agricultural sector using 
RNFI, a measure of farm and farm business profitability was studied. Nickell et al. (2000) used 
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tertiles of real GDP growth corresponding to different levels of economic activity to study the 
impact of the business cycle on bonds. Instead, this study used quartiles of RNFI (Table 5.9) to 
indicate the performance of the agricultural sector. The categories ‘trough’ and ‘peak’ 
corresponded to RNFI less than the first quartile and above the fourth quartile respectively 
whereas RNFI in-between the first and third quartile corresponded to ‘normal times’. Three sub-
samples corresponding to the three categories were then created followed by the calculation of 
three average migration matrices (Table 5.10). Figure 5.7 illustrates historical RNFI in 2019 US 
dollars. Profitability increased significantly from 2002 to 2004, slumped thereafter and trended 
upwards again from 2009 reaching $136 billion in 2013. 
Figure 5.7 Historical Real Net Farm Income 
 
Table 5.9 Real Net Farm Income Quartiles, 2019 US$ Billions  
Minimum First Quartile Median Third Quartile Maximum 
54.20 73.01 83.90 99.05 136.10 
  
The results of the matrices conditioned on RNFI were surprising. Cooperatives rated Aaa 
had a retention rate of 33.33% during peak periods, 38.18% during normal times, and 30.00% 
during trough periods. These results indicated that Aaa rated cooperatives were less stable in 














stable during peak periods except for those rated Aaa, non-investment grade cooperatives were 
most stable during troughs. Migration rates in peak times presented further surprises. 
Cooperatives rated Aaa were more likely to be downgraded to Aa rather than retain their original 
ratings. Furthermore, these findings contradicted the expectation of observing the highest 
probabilities along the diagonal of the matrix. In most instances, cooperatives were more likely 
to be upgraded during peak times and more likely to be downgraded during normal times and 
troughs. 
Table 5.10 Transition Matrices Conditional on Real Net Farm Income 
Peak 
Terminal Rating 
Original Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 33.33% 44.44% 16.67% 5.56% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Aa 5.84% 57.79% 22.73% 9.74% 3.25% 0.65% 0.00% 
A 0.60% 25.75% 47.31% 19.76% 4.79% 1.80% 0.00% 
Baa 0.00% 10.96% 34.25% 34.93% 13.01% 6.85% 0.00% 
Ba 0.00% 9.52% 22.62% 26.19% 29.76% 9.52% 2.38% 
B 0.00% 2.17% 8.70% 19.57% 34.78% 26.09% 8.70% 
Caa 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 80.00% 20.00% 
Normal Times 
Terminal Rating 
Original Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 38.18% 30.91% 23.64% 7.27% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Aa 8.50% 51.02% 20.75% 11.56% 6.80% 1.36% 0.00% 
A 4.03% 25.50% 38.59% 22.82% 7.05% 2.01% 0.00% 
Baa 3.46% 14.23% 26.92% 29.23% 19.62% 5.00% 1.54% 
Ba 0.00% 11.54% 15.93% 30.22% 24.18% 15.93% 2.20% 
B 0.00% 11.02% 16.10% 18.64% 22.03% 24.58% 7.63% 
Caa 0.00% 3.03% 6.06% 6.06% 33.33% 30.30% 21.21% 
Trough 
Terminal Rating 
Original Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 30.00% 45.00% 20.00% 2.50% 2.50% 0.00% 0.00% 
Aa 7.48% 38.78% 28.57% 16.33% 5.44% 3.40% 0.00% 
A 1.36% 18.64% 40.45% 25.91% 10.91% 1.36% 1.36% 
Baa 0.00% 9.55% 26.40% 30.34% 22.47% 9.55% 1.69% 
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Ba 0.00% 1.65% 8.26% 27.27% 33.06% 23.14% 6.61% 
B 0.00% 2.08% 8.33% 10.42% 22.92% 39.58% 16.67% 
Caa 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 19.05% 14.29% 33.33% 33.33% 
 
 5.3 Comparing the Precision of the Estimated Probabilities 
Since diagonal elements mostly had the largest frequencies in all the samples, retention 
rate estimates are likely the most reliable statistics in this study. Table 5.11 shows the coefficient 
of variation (CV) of retention rates corresponding to their respective samples. CV measures the 
variability of an estimate relative to its mean. Estimates obtained from farm supply and 
marketing cooperatives had smaller variations relative to their means across all ratings compared 
to grain marketing cooperatives while retention rates estimated from observations during 
expansions had lower CVs across all ratings compared to those estimated during recessions. Aaa, 
Aa, A, Baa, and B retention rates estimated during normal times had the smallest variation when 
compared to retention rates estimated during peak and trough times. Excluding Caa rated 
cooperatives, retention rates estimated from the unconditional sample had the smallest CVs 
compared to all other samples. 
Table 5.11 Coefficients of Variation of Sample Retention Rates 
Sample Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Unconditional 12.96% 4.12% 4.55% 6.17% 8.12% 10.93% 22.30% 
Grain 
Marketing 




13.80% 4.81% 5.00% 6.35% 8.32% 10.94% 22.23% 
Expansions 14.28% 4.51% 4.84% 6.80% 8.59% 11.36% 26.11% 
Recessions 30.86% 10.10% 13.16% 14.71% 23.27% 34.66% 42.82% 
Peak 33.33% 6.89% 8.17% 11.30% 16.76% 24.82% 89.44% 
Normal 
Times 
17.16% 5.71% 7.31% 9.65% 13.13% 16.13% 33.55% 
Trough 24.15% 10.36% 8.18% 11.36% 12.94% 17.83% 30.86% 
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 5.4 The Predictive Ability of the Unconditional Transition Matrix 
Table 5.12 shows the deviation of the observed 2013–2014 one-year migration matrix 
from the unconditional migration matrix estimated from the 1996–2013 sample. Each element of 
the matrix is the difference between their corresponding values in the observed migration matrix 
and the unconditional migration matrix. A negative deviation indicates the unconditional matrix 
over-estimated the observed transition probability and a positive deviation indicates the 
unconditional matrix under-estimated the observed transition probability. Upgrading to B from 
Caa is the most over-estimated transition (-35.59%) while upgrading to Baa from B is the most 
under-estimated transition (33.02%). Retaining A (-1.31%) was well predicted by the 
unconditional one-year migration matrix. Most predicted retentions rates had large differences 
than what was actually observed. The frequent large cell-by-cell deviations indicate that the 
unconditional one-year migration matrix performed poorly in predicting the observed 2013–2014 
transitions. 
Table 5.12 Deviation from the Unconditional Migration Matrix 
 
 Terminal Rating 
Original Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa -34.51% 11.95% 28.76% -5.31% -0.88% 0.00% 0.00% 
Aa -0.78% 19.74% -1.16% -10.57% -5.55% -1.68% 0.00% 
A -0.52% -6.99% -1.31% 6.03% 3.17% 0.07% -0.44% 
Baa -1.54% -2.90% -19.50% 23.55% -0.65% 2.24% -1.20% 
Ba 0.00% 3.10% -14.99% 4.91% 16.28% -5.68% -3.62% 
B 0.00% -7.08% -12.74% 33.02% 0.00% -3.30% -9.91% 
Caa 0.00% -1.69% -3.39% -10.17% 26.27% -35.59% 24.58% 
 
 5.5 Detecting Time-Inhomogeneity 
The L2 Norm is used to detect changes in regimes across periods. Figure 5.8 shows the L2 
Norms calculated by comparing the element distance of every annual one-year migration 
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matrices with the unconditional migration matrix estimated from the entire 1996–2013 sample. 
The year 2004 was the most similar period to the unconditional migration matrix while 2012 had 
the largest difference in transition probabilities. The L2 Norm was not close to zero nor was it 
horizontal. The annual variation of the L2 Norm indicates that there were changes in regimes 
from period to period. 
Figure 5.8 The L2 Norm, Annual One-Year Matrices vs. One-Year Average Matrix 
 
 5.6 Testing for Time-Dependence 
The study assumed the rating transitions were Markovian and first-order. Time-
dependence was tested using the Likelihood Ratio (LR) and Pearson 𝜒2 (Q) tests. The LR and Q 
tests were twofold. The stochastic process was first tested to confirm that it was not a zero-order 
process. Then, the process was tested to confirm that it was a first-order stochastic process. The 
order was assumed to be inconclusive if the first-order test was rejected. 
 5.6.1 The Unconditional Case 
The test comparing the zero-order against the first order Markov Property is rejected by 
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level. The test was repeated comparing the first-order against the second order Markov chain. 
Again, the null comparing the first-order chain with the second-order was rejected at the 5% 
statistical significance level using both test statistics. LR and Q were 373.58 and 390.20 
respectively with 252 degrees of freedom. Therefore, the order for the unconditional case was 
inconclusive. This means the unconditional matrix cannot be used to predict future distributions 
of cooperatives ratings since the process cannot be confirmed to be a first-order Markov chain. 
 5.6.2 The Type of Cooperative 
The zero-order assumption was rejected for grain cooperatives, with  Q of 158.32 with 36 
degrees of freedom at the 5% statistical significance level. However, the null hypothesis, using 
LR = 49.13 with 36 degrees of freedom, was not rejected at the same level of significance. 
Therefore, the order of the rating dependency of grain marketing cooperatives was a zero. 
 The null hypothesis for the zero-order assumption for farm supply and marketing 
cooperatives was rejected by both test statistics. LR = 525.64 and Q = 1328.89 with 36 degrees 
of freedom. The first-order assumption was also rejected at the same significance level. Test 
statistics were LR = 348.82 and Q = 385.67 with 252 degrees of freedom. Therefore, the degree 
of dependency was inconclusive. 
 5.6.3 The Stage in the Business Cycle 
The zero-order assumption test statistics for the expansion sub-sample were LR = 545.87 
and Q = 1316.63 with 36 degrees of freedom. The null was rejected at a statistical significance 
level of 5%. The first-order assumption resulted in LR = 350.51 and Q = 366.26 with 252 
degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis was also rejected using both tests statistics at the same 
significance level. Therefore, the order of the stochastic process during expansions was 
inconclusive. 
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Test statistics assessing the zero-order assumption for recessions were LR = 86.36 and Q 
= 194.02 with 36 degrees of freedom. The first-order assumption was rejected at the 5% level of 
statistical significance. There were not enough periods to test the first-order assumption, and thus 
the recessionary stochastic process was inconclusive. 
 5.6.4 The Stage of the Agricultural Business Cycle 
The zero-order test for peak periods resulted in test statistics of LR = 166.97 and Q = 
431.12 with 36 degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis was rejected using both test statistics at 
the 5% statistical significance level. There were not enough periods to test the first-order Markov 
property and as a result the degree of dependency was inconclusive. 
The zero-order assumption was again rejected at the 5% significance level during normal 
times. The test statistics were LR = 257.66 and Q = 611.40 with 36 degrees of freedom. There 
were not enough observations to test the first-order Markov property therefore the order of 
dependency is inconclusive. 
Test statistics for the zero-order test during troughs were LR = 213.99 and Q = 490.77 
with 36 degrees of freedom. The null was rejected by both test statistics at the 5% statistical 
significance level. Similar to the peak and normal times sub-samples, there were not enough 
observations to construct a second-order Markov chain and test the first order property. 
Therefore, the degree of dependency was inconclusive. 
Grain marketing cooperatives were the only sub-sample that resulted in the order of the 
process being determined. Therefore, stationarity is tested for this sub-sample only. 
 5.7 Testing for Time-Homogeneity 
There was evidence of regime change in the sample as observed by the detection of time-
inhomogeneity by the L2 Norms. The grain marketing sub-sample was split into two similarly 
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sized sub-periods to test for time-homogeneity using the Likelihood Ratio (LR) and Pearson 𝜒2 
(Q) tests. It is possible for the test results to differ. According to Bickenbach and Bode (2003), 
the Pearson statistic is sensitive to very low transition probabilities estimated from the entire 
sample, and as a result, it is more reasonable to infer conclusions of time-homogeneity based on 
the LR. 
The grain sub-sample was split into two sub-periods. Sub-period 1 spanned from 1996–
2005, and sub-period 2 spanned from 2005-2013. Time-homogeneity failed to be rejected using 
the Q = 33.65 test statistic with 22 degrees of freedom at the 𝛼 = 0.05 significance level. The p-
value was 0.0533. However, the null hypothesis was rejected using the LR = 39.93 test statistic 
with 22 degrees of freedom. Therefore, the conclusion is that the transition probabilities of grain 
cooperatives were non-time-homogeneous, and the order of the rating process was inconclusive. 
 5.8 Discussion 
The average cooperative in the 1996–2013 sample had a prime rating of Baa. Of the 
2,790 cooperative observations, 75.89% were rated prime, and 24.12% were rated not prime. 
When the letter grade was considered, only 117 (4.19%) were rated Aaa, the highest possible 
rating, and 61 (2.19%) were rated Caa, the lowest possible rating. Most sample years 
experienced a negative rating drift implying downgrades exceeded upgrades. The large spike in 
upgrades during the 2008–2009 period was a result of the runup in grain prices that contributed 
to improved profitability. Retention rates were much smaller than the estimates calculated by 
Altman and Kao (1992b), Nickell et al. (2000), Bangia et al. (2002), and Carty (1997). The 
smaller retention rates resulted in the probabilities around the diagonal of the matrix being larger 
than those estimated in the aforementioned studies. The observed higher volatility of 
cooperatives may confirm the stabilizing effects of subjective components outlined by Gloy et al. 
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(2005). The rating stability does not deteriorate strictly with decreasing credit quality since, in 
the unconditional case, Aa rated cooperatives were more stable than those rated Aaa and B rated 
cooperatives were slightly more stable than those rate Ba. In the long-run, the steady state 
indicated that cooperatives were most likely to transition to the A rating and were unlikely to be 
downgraded or remain rated Caa. 
Although most retention rates declined with increasing time horizon they did not do so 
continuously as observed by Altman and Kao (1992b). The proportion unchanged showed a 
declining trend for the first 12 years and subsequently trended upwards thereafter. Cooperatives 
were more likely to transition than remain unchanged. When the direction of the rating change 
was considered, cooperatives were more likely to be upgraded than downgraded albeit with a 
similar probability. Rising star rates exhibited a moderate negative relationship, implied by the 
correlation coefficient, with the Effective Federal Funds Rate. This suggested a propensity for 
upgrades as funding costs declined. The opposite relationship was not observed with rising star 
rates nor was there any meaningful relationship with changes in RNFI.  
Path dependence in the migration process was identified when prior migration 
experiences were considered. The results confirmed that the prior credit rating history had 
predictive power of the subsequent rating’s direction. Relative to the conditional migration 
matrices, the unconditional migration matrix had the most reliable estimates, as measured by the 
coefficient of variation. The lower variation of the unconditional matrix was primarily attributed 
to a larger frequency of possible rating transitions. Grain marketing cooperatives had a higher 
likelihood of being upgraded than farm supply/marketing. The stability of cooperatives 
conditioned on the business cycle were similar however differed by propensity to upgrade or 
downgrade. It was surprising that Aaa cooperatives were more likely to be downgraded to Aa 
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during peak agricultural periods instead of retaining their rating. The expectation was for 
cooperatives to improve in stability in more favorable conditions. Nevertheless, cooperatives 
were generally more likely to be upgraded during peak times and more likely to be downgraded 
in normal times and troughs in most instances. 
The variance in relative values of the L2 Norm indicated the presence of multiple regimes 
in the sample and provided further evidence that the estimated probabilities were likely non-
stationary. Although grain cooperatives were found to be zero-order, stationarity across time was 
not confirmed. The results of the statistical tests concluded that the rating process is not a first-
order Markov chain. The implication of not knowing the order of the process is that the number 
of prior periods that determine the rating path a cooperative would take cannot be determined. 
Consequently, the steady state distribution calculated may not provide accurate predictions of 
rating transitions in the long-run. 
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion & Recommendations 
The purpose of this study was to assess the credit rating migration behavior of the risk of 
agricultural cooperatives. The Credit Metrics component of Moody’s Global Agricultural 
Cooperatives Industry Rating Methodology was used to assign annual credit ratings. The Credit 
Metrics component was used to solely assess a cooperative’s financial risk. An unconditional 
matrix and matrices conditioned on the type of cooperative, stage of the business cycle, and the 
performance of the agriculture sector were estimated. Matrices that varied by time horizon were 
also estimated. Rating drift and rating activity were calculated to assess the trends in credit 
quality across the sample in addition to rating magnitude. Coefficients of variation and standard 
errors of the estimates were calculated to measure precision and reliability. The L2 Norm was 
used to detect regime change and the Pearson 𝜒2 and the Likelihood Ratio test were used to test 
the assumptions of time-homogeneity and the Markov property. 
Stability of cooperatives generally declined with increasing time horizon but did not do 
so strictly. Most sample years experienced a negative rating drift implying downgrades exceeded 
upgrades. Cooperatives were more likely to experience a credit rating transition than remain 
unchanged. The average size of the notch change was 0.46. Moreover, cooperatives were more 
likely to experience a downgrade than an upgrade and the average downgrade notch size (0.47) 
was slightly larger than the average upgrade notch size (0.45). There were numerous instances of 
downgrades and upgrades spanning across multiple rating classes. Because cooperatives being 
small and not diversified enough to withstand adverse challenges to their operations, notch size 
is high. The results confirmed that the prior credit rating history had predictive power of the 
subsequent rating’s direction. Multiple regimes in the sample were detected and migration 
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probabilities of grain marketing cooperatives to be non-stationary. The rating process did not 
follow a first order Markov chain. 
The findings of this study provide agricultural cooperative lenders, managers, and 
directors with a comprehensive information set of how credit risk changes from period to period. 
A useful application would be the self-assessment of a cooperative against the performance of its 
peers. For example, a strategy’s effectiveness over time can be assessed; that is, has the credit 
risk of a cooperative improved or deteriorated under the strategy? In addition, the impact of a 
change of strategy on credit risk can be assessed. 
The contribution to the literature is a first attempt in the assessment of the historical 
behavior of changes in credit risk of cooperatives. It conceptualizes the expected credit risk 
behavior of cooperatives over time and responses to exogenous favorable and adverse factors. A 
limitation of this study is that a discrete-time Markov chain was used to obtain transition 
probabilities. A one-year migration matrix is unable to capture all the changes in credit risk that 
occur over an annual interval. Future research would include assessing the migration behavior of 
cooperatives using lenders’ internal ratings in continuous-time instead of discrete-time. Internal 
ratings would capture subjective and objective components from the lender’s perspective. To 
improve the accuracy of the estimates, a larger dataset consisting of more cooperatives and 
sample years would be beneficial. 
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Appendix A - Additional Tables & Figures 
Table A.1 Retention Rates by Credit Rating as Time Horizon Increases 
Time Horizon Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
1 62.50% 68.42% 34.15% 22.22% 21.74% 25.00% 0.00% 
2 37.50% 47.37% 43.90% 13.89% 13.04% 37.50% 0.00% 
3 12.50% 39.47% 26.83% 25.00% 21.74% 37.50% 0.00% 
4 25.00% 36.84% 36.59% 22.22% 26.09% 12.50% 100.00% 
5 12.50% 34.21% 29.27% 30.56% 26.09% 25.00% 0.00% 
6 37.50% 21.05% 24.39% 25.00% 26.09% 12.50% 0.00% 
7 0.00% 36.84% 26.83% 19.44% 8.70% 37.50% 100.00% 
8 37.50% 39.47% 21.95% 25.00% 17.39% 25.00% 0.00% 
9 12.50% 31.58% 34.15% 25.00% 17.39% 12.50% 0.00% 
10 0.00% 18.42% 34.15% 27.78% 30.43% 0.00% 0.00% 
11 12.50% 18.42% 24.39% 27.78% 26.09% 25.00% 0.00% 
12 0.00% 5.26% 19.51% 30.56% 34.78% 37.50% 0.00% 
13 62.50% 50.00% 29.27% 11.11% 8.70% 12.50% 100.00% 
14 25.00% 47.37% 36.59% 25.00% 8.70% 12.50% 100.00% 
15 0.00% 36.84% 29.27% 25.00% 21.74% 12.50% 0.00% 
16 12.50% 50.00% 34.15% 30.56% 8.70% 12.50% 0.00% 
17 0.00% 50.00% 41.46% 8.33% 8.70% 12.50% 0.00% 




Table A.2 Migration Rate Behavior, One to Five-Year Time Horizon 
Migration Rates 1 Year Later 
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 34.51% 38.05% 21.24% 5.31% 0.88% 0.00% 0.00% 
Aa 7.56% 49.75% 23.19% 12.27% 5.55% 1.68% 0.00% 
A 2.34% 23.36% 41.31% 23.07% 7.74% 1.75% 0.44% 
Baa 1.54% 11.99% 28.60% 30.99% 18.84% 6.85% 1.20% 
Ba 0.00% 8.01% 14.99% 28.42% 28.17% 16.80% 3.62% 
B 0.00% 7.08% 12.74% 16.98% 25.00% 28.30% 9.91% 
Caa 0.00% 1.69% 3.39% 10.17% 23.73% 35.59% 25.42% 
Migration Rates 2 Years Later 
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 26.79% 33.93% 25.00% 12.50% 1.79% 0.00% 0.00% 
Aa 7.50% 40.77% 26.14% 16.45% 7.31% 1.65% 0.18% 
A 2.66% 23.35% 36.99% 22.10% 10.97% 3.13% 0.78% 
Baa 1.65% 18.46% 24.68% 28.52% 18.83% 6.58% 1.28% 
Ba 0.00% 8.31% 21.18% 27.08% 21.18% 17.16% 5.09% 
B 0.49% 9.80% 15.20% 14.71% 26.47% 25.98% 7.35% 
Caa 0.00% 3.39% 8.47% 11.86% 18.64% 38.98% 18.64% 
Migration Rates 3 Years Later 
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 23.42% 42.34% 24.32% 9.01% 0.90% 0.00% 0.00% 
Aa 6.82% 38.79% 27.10% 16.76% 7.60% 2.14% 0.78% 
A 2.50% 23.50% 33.50% 23.00% 12.67% 3.83% 1.00% 
Baa 1.18% 17.32% 25.20% 29.72% 17.13% 7.48% 1.97% 
Ba 0.58% 9.86% 21.16% 28.70% 20.87% 14.78% 4.06% 
B 0.00% 7.33% 16.75% 13.09% 27.75% 29.84% 5.24% 
Caa 0.00% 7.02% 5.26% 12.28% 24.56% 29.82% 21.05% 
Migration Rates 4 Years Later 
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 18.27% 40.38% 28.85% 7.69% 2.88% 1.92% 0.00% 
Aa 6.13% 38.29% 25.60% 16.85% 9.41% 2.41% 1.31% 
A 3.21% 26.07% 33.21% 20.89% 10.71% 5.00% 0.89% 
Baa 1.66% 16.15% 26.50% 26.50% 18.01% 9.32% 1.86% 
Ba 0.61% 10.61% 20.00% 28.48% 23.94% 13.64% 2.73% 
B 0.00% 10.50% 13.81% 24.31% 19.89% 23.76% 7.73% 
Caa 0.00% 1.82% 10.91% 18.18% 25.45% 27.27% 16.36% 
Migration Rates 5 Years Later 
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 23.60% 40.45% 25.84% 4.49% 3.37% 2.25% 0.00% 
Aa 6.72% 36.32% 26.62% 15.92% 8.46% 4.23% 1.74% 
A 2.89% 26.97% 31.41% 19.85% 10.79% 6.36% 1.73% 
Baa 0.86% 19.87% 24.62% 29.16% 16.85% 6.70% 1.94% 
Ba 0.63% 11.32% 22.33% 25.79% 25.16% 13.21% 1.57% 
B 0.57% 9.77% 14.94% 24.14% 20.69% 24.14% 5.75% 
Caa 0.00% 8.00% 16.00% 18.00% 16.00% 30.00% 12.00% 
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Table A.3 One-Year Average Rating Transition Matrix, Farm Supply and Marketing 
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 39.02% 37.80% 17.07% 4.88% 1.22% 0.00% 0.00% 
 (5.4) (5.4) (4.2) (2.4) (1.2) (0.0) (0.0) 
Aa 6.46% 49.00% 24.50% 12.92% 5.12% 2.00% 0.00% 
 (1.2) (2.4) (2.0) (1.6) (1.0) (0.7) (0.0) 
A 1.89% 22.13% 40.65% 24.70% 8.23% 1.89% 0.51% 
 (0.6) (1.7) (2.0) (1.8) (1.1) (0.6) (0.3) 
Baa 1.13% 10.59% 28.17% 31.95% 19.66% 7.18% 1.32% 
 (0.5) (1.3) (2.0) (2.0) (1.7) (1.1) (0.5) 
Ba 0.00% 6.41% 15.60% 28.69% 28.69% 16.71% 3.90% 
 (0.0) (1.3) (1.9) (2.4) (2.4) (2.0) (1.0) 
B 0.00% 5.47% 12.44% 16.92% 25.87% 29.35% 9.95% 
 (0.0) (1.6) (2.3) (2.6) (3.1) (3.2) (2.1) 
Caa 0.00% 1.72% 3.45% 10.34% 24.14% 34.48% 25.86% 
 (0.0) (1.7) (2.4) (4.0) (5.6) (6.2) (5.7) 
 
Table A.4 One-Year Average Rating Transition Matrix, Grain Marketing 
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 22.58% 38.71% 32.26% 6.45% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 (7.5) (8.7) (8.4) (4.4) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
Aa 10.96% 52.05% 19.18% 10.27% 6.85% 0.68% 0.00% 
 (2.6) (4.1) (3.3) (2.5) (2.1) (0.7) (0.0) 
A 4.90% 30.39% 45.10% 13.73% 4.90% 0.98% 0.00% 
 (2.1) (4.6) (4.9) (3.4) (2.1) (1.0) (0.0) 
Baa 5.45% 25.45% 32.73% 21.82% 10.91% 3.64% 0.00% 
 (3.1) (5.9) (6.3) (5.6) (4.2) (2.5) (0.0) 
Ba 0.00% 28.57% 7.14% 25.00% 21.43% 17.86% 0.00% 
 (0.0) (8.5) (4.9) (8.2) (7.8) (7.2) (0.0) 
B 0.00% 36.36% 18.18% 18.18% 9.09% 9.09% 9.09% 
 (0.0) (14.5) (11.6) (11.6) (8.7) (8.7) (8.7) 
Caa 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 




Table A.5 One-Year Average Rating Transition Matrix, Expansionary Periods 
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 34.78% 38.04% 19.57% 6.52% 1.09% 0.00% 0.00% 
 (5.0) (5.1) (4.1) (2.6) (1.1) (0.0) (0.0) 
Aa 6.84% 49.70% 23.54% 12.27% 5.84% 1.81% 0.00% 
 (1.1) (2.2) (1.9) (1.5) (1.1) (0.6) (0.0) 
A 2.23% 21.48% 42.27% 23.88% 7.90% 1.72% 0.52% 
 (0.6) (1.7) (2.0) (1.8) (1.1) (0.5) (0.3) 
Baa 0.42% 10.21% 29.79% 31.04% 19.79% 7.71% 1.04% 
 (0.3) (1.4) (2.1) (2.1) (1.8) (1.2) (0.5) 
Ba 0.00% 4.23% 14.33% 29.32% 30.62% 17.92% 3.58% 
 (0.0) (1.1) (2.0) (2.6) (2.6) (2.2) (1.1) 
B 0.00% 4.17% 8.93% 19.64% 25.00% 31.55% 10.71% 
 (0.0) (1.5) (2.2) (3.1) (3.3) (3.6) (2.4) 
Caa 0.00% 0.00% 2.27% 11.36% 22.73% 38.64% 25.00% 
 (0.0) (0.0) (2.2) (4.8) (6.3) (7.3) (6.5) 
 
Table A.6 One-Year Average Rating Transition Matrix, Recessionary Periods 
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 33.33% 38.10% 28.57% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 (10.3) (10.6) (9.9) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
Aa 11.22% 50.00% 21.43% 12.24% 4.08% 1.02% 0.00% 
 (3.2) (5.1) (4.1) (3.3) (2.0) (1.0) (0.0) 
A 2.91% 33.98% 35.92% 18.45% 6.80% 1.94% 0.00% 
 (1.7) (4.7) (4.7) (3.8) (2.5) (1.4) (0.0) 
Baa 6.73% 20.19% 23.08% 30.77% 14.42% 2.88% 1.92% 
 (2.5) (3.9) (4.1) (4.5) (3.4) (1.6) (1.3) 
Ba 0.00% 22.50% 17.50% 25.00% 18.75% 12.50% 3.75% 
 (0.0) (4.7) (4.2) (4.8) (4.4) (3.7) (2.1) 
B 0.00% 18.18% 27.27% 6.82% 25.00% 15.91% 6.82% 
 (0.0) (5.8) (6.7) (3.8) (6.5) (5.5) (3.8) 
Caa 0.00% 6.67% 6.67% 6.67% 26.67% 26.67% 26.67% 




Table A.7 One-Year Average Rating Transition Matrix, Peak 
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 33.33% 44.44% 16.67% 5.56% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 (11.1) (11.7) (8.8) (5.4) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
Aa 5.84% 57.79% 22.73% 9.74% 3.25% 0.65% 0.00% 
 (1.9) (4.0) (3.4) (2.4) (1.4) (0.6) (0.0) 
A 0.60% 25.75% 47.31% 19.76% 4.79% 1.80% 0.00% 
 (0.6) (3.4) (3.9) (3.1) (1.7) (1.0) (0.0) 
Baa 0.00% 10.96% 34.25% 34.93% 13.01% 6.85% 0.00% 
 (0.0) (2.6) (3.9) (3.9) (2.8) (2.1) (0.0) 
Ba 0.00% 9.52% 22.62% 26.19% 29.76% 9.52% 2.38% 
 (0.0) (3.2) (4.6) (4.8) (5.0) (3.2) (1.7) 
B 0.00% 2.17% 8.70% 19.57% 34.78% 26.09% 8.70% 
 (0.0) (2.2) (4.2) (5.8) (7.0) (6.5) (4.2) 
Caa 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 80.00% 20.00% 
 (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (17.9) (17.9) 
 
Table A.8 One-Year Average Rating Transition Matrix, Normal Times 
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 38.18% 30.91% 23.64% 7.27% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 (6.6) (6.2) (5.7) (3.5) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) 
Aa 8.50% 51.02% 20.75% 11.56% 6.80% 1.36% 0.00% 
 (1.6) (2.9) (2.4) (1.9) (1.5) (0.7) (0.0) 
A 4.03% 25.50% 38.59% 22.82% 7.05% 2.01% 0.00% 
 (1.1) (2.5) (2.8) (2.4) (1.5) (0.8) (0.0) 
Baa 3.46% 14.23% 26.92% 29.23% 19.62% 5.00% 1.54% 
 (1.1) (2.2) (2.8) (2.8) (2.5) (1.4) (0.8) 
Ba 0.00% 11.54% 15.93% 30.22% 24.18% 15.93% 2.20% 
 (0.0) (2.4) (2.7) (3.4) (3.2) (2.7) (1.1) 
B 0.00% 11.02% 16.10% 18.64% 22.03% 24.58% 7.63% 
 (0.0) (2.9) (3.4) (3.6) (3.8) (4.0) (2.4) 
Caa 0.00% 3.03% 6.06% 6.06% 33.33% 30.30% 21.21% 
 (0.0) (3.0) (4.2) (4.2) (8.2) (8.0) (7.1) 
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Table A.9 One-Year Average Rating Transition Matrix, Trough 
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 30.00% 45.00% 20.00% 2.50% 2.50% 0.00% 0.00% 
 (7.2) (7.9) (6.3) (2.5) (2.5) (0.0) (0.0) 
Aa 7.48% 38.78% 28.57% 16.33% 5.44% 3.40% 0.00% 
 (2.2) (4.0) (3.7) (3.0) (1.9) (1.5) (0.0) 
A 1.36% 18.64% 40.45% 25.91% 10.91% 1.36% 1.36% 
 (0.8) (2.6) (3.3) (3.0) (2.1) (0.8) (0.8) 
Baa 0.00% 9.55% 26.40% 30.34% 22.47% 9.55% 1.69% 
 (0.0) (2.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.1) (2.2) (1.0) 
Ba 0.00% 1.65% 8.26% 27.27% 33.06% 23.14% 6.61% 
 (0.0) (1.2) (2.5) (4.0) (4.3) (3.8) (2.3) 
B 0.00% 2.08% 8.33% 10.42% 22.92% 39.58% 16.67% 
 (0.0) (2.1) (4.0) (4.4) (6.1) (7.1) (5.4) 
Caa 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 19.05% 14.29% 33.33% 33.33% 
 (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (8.6) (7.6) (10.3) (10.3) 
 
Table A.10 Two-Year Average Rating Transition Matrix, 1996–2013 
 Terminal Rating 
Original Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 26.79% 33.93% 25.00% 12.50% 1.79% 0.00% 0.00% 
 (4.2) (4.5) (4.1) (3.1) (1.3) (0.0) (0.0) 
Aa 7.50% 40.77% 26.14% 16.45% 7.31% 1.65% 0.18% 
 (1.1) (2.1) (1.9) (1.6) (1.1) (0.5) (0.2) 
A 2.66% 23.35% 36.99% 22.10% 10.97% 3.13% 0.78% 
 (0.6) (1.7) (1.9) (1.6) (1.2) (0.7) (0.3) 
Baa 1.65% 18.46% 24.68% 28.52% 18.83% 6.58% 1.28% 
 (0.5) (1.7) (1.8) (1.9) (1.7) (1.1) (0.5) 
Ba 0.00% 8.31% 21.18% 27.08% 21.18% 17.16% 5.09% 
 (0.0) (1.4) (2.1) (2.3) (2.1) (2.0) (1.1) 
B 0.49% 9.80% 15.20% 14.71% 26.47% 25.98% 7.35% 
 (0.5) (2.1) (2.5) (2.5) (3.1) (3.1) (1.8) 
Caa 0.00% 3.39% 8.47% 11.86% 18.64% 38.98% 18.64% 




Table A.11 Three-Year Average Rating Transition Matrix, 1996–2013 
 Terminal Rating 
Original Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 23.42% 42.34% 24.32% 9.01% 0.90% 0.00% 0.00% 
 (4.0) (4.7) (4.1) (2.7) (0.9) (0.0) (0.0) 
Aa 6.82% 38.79% 27.10% 16.76% 7.60% 2.14% 0.78% 
 (1.1) (2.2) (2.0) (1.6) (1.2) (0.6) (0.4) 
A 2.50% 23.50% 33.50% 23.00% 12.67% 3.83% 1.00% 
 (0.6) (1.7) (1.9) (1.7) (1.4) (0.8) (0.4) 
Baa 1.18% 17.32% 25.20% 29.72% 17.13% 7.48% 1.97% 
 (0.5) (1.7) (1.9) (2.0) (1.7) (1.2) (0.6) 
Ba 0.58% 9.86% 21.16% 28.70% 20.87% 14.78% 4.06% 
 (0.4) (1.6) (2.2) (2.4) (2.2) (1.9) (1.1) 
B 0.00% 7.33% 16.75% 13.09% 27.75% 29.84% 5.24% 
 (0.0) (1.9) (2.7) (2.4) (3.2) (3.3) (1.6) 
Caa 0.00% 7.02% 5.26% 12.28% 24.56% 29.82% 21.05% 
 (0.0) (3.4) (3.0) (4.3) (5.7) (6.1) (5.4) 
 
Table A.12 Four-Year Average Rating Transition Matrix, 1996–2013 
 Terminal Rating 
Original Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 18.27% 40.38% 28.85% 7.69% 2.88% 1.92% 0.00% 
 (3.8) (4.8) (4.4) (2.6) (1.6) (1.3) (0.0) 
Aa 6.13% 38.29% 25.60% 16.85% 9.41% 2.41% 1.31% 
 (1.1) (2.3) (2.0) (1.8) (1.4) (0.7) (0.5) 
A 3.21% 26.07% 33.21% 20.89% 10.71% 5.00% 0.89% 
 (0.7) (1.9) (2.0) (1.7) (1.3) (0.9) (0.4) 
Baa 1.66% 16.15% 26.50% 26.50% 18.01% 9.32% 1.86% 
 (0.6) (1.7) (2.0) (2.0) (1.7) (1.3) (0.6) 
Ba 0.61% 10.61% 20.00% 28.48% 23.94% 13.64% 2.73% 
 (0.4) (1.7) (2.2) (2.5) (2.3) (1.9) (0.9) 
B 0.00% 10.50% 13.81% 24.31% 19.89% 23.76% 7.73% 
 (0.0) (2.3) (2.6) (3.2) (3.0) (3.2) (2.0) 
Caa 0.00% 1.82% 10.91% 18.18% 25.45% 27.27% 16.36% 
 (0.0) (1.8) (4.2) (5.2) (5.9) (6.0) (5.0) 
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Table A.13 Five-Year Average Rating Transition Matrix, 1996–2013 
 Terminal Rating 
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 23.60% 40.45% 25.84% 4.49% 3.37% 2.25% 0.00% 
 (4.5) (5.2) (4.6) (2.2) (1.9) (1.6) (0.0) 
Aa 6.72% 36.32% 26.62% 15.92% 8.46% 4.23% 1.74% 
 (1.2) (2.4) (2.2) (1.8) (1.4) (1.0) (0.7) 
A 2.89% 26.97% 31.41% 19.85% 10.79% 6.36% 1.73% 
 (0.7) (1.9) (2.0) (1.8) (1.4) (1.1) (0.6) 
Baa 0.86% 19.87% 24.62% 29.16% 16.85% 6.70% 1.94% 
 (0.4) (1.9) (2.0) (2.1) (1.7) (1.2) (0.6) 
Ba 0.63% 11.32% 22.33% 25.79% 25.16% 13.21% 1.57% 
 (0.4) (1.8) (2.3) (2.5) (2.4) (1.9) (0.7) 
B 0.57% 9.77% 14.94% 24.14% 20.69% 24.14% 5.75% 
 (0.6) (2.3) (2.7) (3.2) (3.1) (3.2) (1.8) 
Caa 0.00% 8.00% 16.00% 18.00% 16.00% 30.00% 12.00% 
 (0.0) (3.8) (5.2) (5.4) (5.2) (6.5) (4.6) 
 
Table A.14 Actual One-Year Migration Matrix, 2013–2014 
 Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa 
Aaa 0.00% 50.00% 50.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Aa 6.78% 69.49% 22.03% 1.69% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
A 1.82% 16.36% 40.00% 29.09% 10.91% 1.82% 0.00% 
Baa 0.00% 9.09% 9.09% 54.55% 18.18% 9.09% 0.00% 
Ba 0.00% 11.11% 0.00% 33.33% 44.44% 11.11% 0.00% 
B 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 50.00% 25.00% 25.00% 0.00% 
Caa 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 
 
Table A.15 One-Year Average Migration Matrix, Prime Scale, 1996–2013 
 Prime Not Prime 
Prime 86.39% 13.61% 
 (0.8) (0.8) 
Not Prime 43.47% 56.53% 
 (1.9) (1.9) 
 
